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Abstract. We consider a class of N -player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular
control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with
submodular costs. We call these games monotone-follower games. In a not necessarily
Markovian setting, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria. Moreover, we introduce
a sequence of approximating games by restricting, for each n ∈ N, the players’ admissible
strategies to the set of Lipschitz processes with Lipschitz constant bounded by n. We prove
that, for each n ∈ N, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the approximating game and that the
sequence of Nash equilibria converges, in the Meyer-Zheng sense, to a weak (distributional)
Nash equilibrium of the original game of singular control. As a byproduct, such a convergence
also provides approximation results of the equilibrium values across the two classes of games.
We finally show how our results can be employed to prove existence of open-loop Nash
equilibria in an N -player stochastic differential game with singular controls, and we propose
an algorithm to determine a Nash equilibrium for the monotone-follower game.
Keywords: nonzero-sum games; singular control; submodular games; Meyer-Zheng topol-
ogy; maximum principle; Nash equilibrium; stochastic differential games; monotone-follower
problem.
AMS subject classification: 91A15, 06B23, 49J45, 60G07, 91A23, 93E20.
1. Introduction
We consider a class of stochastic N -player games over a finite time-horizon in which each
player, indexed by i = 1, ..., N , faces a multi-dimensional singular stochastic control problem of
monotone-follower type. On a complete probability space, consider a multi-dimensional ca`dla`g
(i.e., right-continuous with left limits) process L and, for i = 1, ..., N , multi-dimensional con-
tinuous semimartingales f i with nonnegative components. Denote by F the right-continuous
extension of the filtration generated by f = (f1, ..., fN ) and L, augmented by the sets of zero
probability. We call monotone-follower game the game in which each player i is allowed to
choose a multi-dimensional control Ai in the set of admissible strategies
A := {F-adapted processes with nondecreasing, nonnegative and ca`dla`g components} ,
in order to minimize the cost functional
J i(Ai, A−i) := E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, A
i
t, A
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , A
i
T , A
−i
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i
t
]
,
where A−i := (Aj)j 6=i. Here T < ∞ and hi and gi are suitable nonnegative convex cost
functions.
Next, we introduce a sequence of approximating games with regular controls in the following
way. For each n ∈ N, define the n-Lipschitz game as the game in which players are restricted
to pick a Lipschitz control in the set of admissible n-Lipschitz strategies
L(n) = {A ∈ A |A is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant smaller that n and A0 = 0} ,
in order to minimize the cost functionals J i.
Date: January 2, 2019.
1
2 DIANETTI AND FERRARI
Our main contributions are the following.
(1) Under submodularity conditions on the functions hi and gi, we establish the existence
of Nash equilibria for the monotone-follower and the n-Lipschitz games.
(2) We show connections across these two classes of games. In particular:
(i) any sequence obtained by choosing, for each n ∈ N, a Nash equilibrium of the
n-Lipschitz game is relatively compact in the Meyer-Zheng topology, and any
accumulation point of this sequence is the law of a weak Nash equilibrium of
the monotone-follower game (see Definition 4 below). That is, any accumulation
point is a Nash equilibrium on a suitable probability space on which are defined
processes f¯ and L¯ such that their joint law coincides with the joint law of f and
L;
(ii) the N -dimensional vector whose components are the expected costs associated
to any weak Nash equilibrium obtained through the previous approximation is a
Nash equilibrium payoff. Moreover, for each ε > 0, there exist nε ∈ N large enough
and a Nash equilibium of the nε-Lipschitz game which is an ε-Nash equilibrium
of the monotone-follower game.
Furthermore: we provide applications of our results to deduce existence of Nash equilibria
for a class of stochastic differential games with singular controls and non-Markovian random
costs; in the spirit of [67], we construct an algorithm to determine a Nash equilibrium of the
monotone-follower game; we provide an existence result for the monotone-follower game in
which players are allowed to choose both a regular control and a singular control.
To the best of our knowledge, general existence and approximation results of Nash equilibria
in N -player non-Markovian stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control appear in
this paper for the first time.
1.1. Background literature. A singular stochastic control problem appears for the first
time in [10], where the problem of controlling the motion of a spaceship has been addressed.
Later on, examples of solvable singular stochastic control problems have been studied in [11].
Singular stochastic control problems of monotone-follower type have been introduced and
studied in [40] and [42]. A monotone-follower problem is the problem of tracking a stochastic
process by a nondecreasing process in order to optimize a certain performance criterion. Since
then, this class of problems has found many applications in economics and finance (see [9],
[21], [23], [26], [53], among many others), operations research (see, e.g., [32] and [36]), queuing
theory (see, e.g., [44]), mathematical biology (see, e.g., [2] and [3]), aerospace engineering (see,
e.g., [52]), and insurance mathematics (see [49], [63], and [64], among others).
The literature on singular stochastic control problems experienced results on existence of
minima (or maxima) (see [18], [29] and [37], among others), characterization of the optimizers
through first order conditions (see, e.g.,[8], [9], [20] and [55]), as well as connections to opti-
mal stopping problems (see, e.g., [42] or the more recent [15], [19], [59]) and to constrained
backward stochastic differential equations [16]. We also mention the recent work [47], as their
version of the monotone-follower problem is the single-agent version (in weak formulation) of
our game.
The number of contributions on games of singular controls is still quite limited (see [27],
[30], [34], [35], [38], [45], [46], [65], [71]), although these problems have received an increasing
interest in the last years. We briefly discuss here some of these works. In [65] it is determined
a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a monotone-follower game with symmetric payoffs (i.e.,
the cost functional is the same for all players), and it is provided a characterization of any
equilibria through a system of first order conditions. The same approach is also followed
in [30] for a game in which players are allowed to choose a regular control and a singular
control. Such a problem has been motivated by a question arising in public economic theory.
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A general characterization of Nash equilibria through the Pontryagin Maximum Principle
approach has been investigated in the recent [71] for regular-singular stochastic differential
games. Connections between nonzero-sum games of singular control and games of optimal
stopping have been tackled in [27]. It is also worth mentioning some recent works on mean field
games with singular controls (see [31] and [33]) and their connection to symmetric N -player
games (see [35]). A complete analysis of a Markovian N -player stochastic game in which
players can control an underlying diffusive dynamic through a control of bounded-variation
is provided in the recent [34]. There, the authors derive a Nash equilibrium by solving a
system of moving free boundary problems. General existence result for stochastic games with
multi-dimensional singular controls and non-Markovian costs were, however, missing in the
literature, and this has motivated our study.
1.2. Our results. We now provide more details on our results by discussing the ideas and
techniques of their proofs.
The existence results. Going back to the seminal work of J. Nash [58], a typical way to prove
existence of Nash equilibria is to show existence of a fixed point for the best reply map. In
the spirit of [67], our strategy to prove existence of Nash equilibria in the monotone-follower
game and in the n-Lipschitz game is to exploit the submodular structure of our games in
order to apply a lattice-theoretical fixed point theorem: the Tarski’s fixed point theorem (see
[66]). We proceed as follows. We first endow the spaces of admissible strategies A and L(n)
(defined above) with a lattice structure. While the lattice L(n) is complete, the same does
not hold true for A. To overcome this problem, we show that, under suitable assumptions,
each “reasonable” strategy lives in a bounded subset of A, and we restrict our analysis to
this subset, which is in fact a complete lattice. We then prove that the best reply maps
are non empty. To accomplish this task in the n-Lipschitz game, we employ the so-called
classical direct method. Indeed, since each strategy is forced to be n-Lipschitz, then the
sequence of time-derivatives of any minimizing sequence is bounded in L2. Hence, Banach-
Saks’ theorem, together with the lower semi-continuity and the convexity of the costs, allows
to conclude existence of the minima. On the other hand, for the monotone-follower game we
use some more recent techniques already employed to prove existence of optimizers in singular
stochastic control problems (see [9] and [61]). Assuming a uniform coercivity condition on the
costs (which is, anyway, necessary for existence of Nash equilibria; see Remark 2.6 below) we
can use a theorem by Y.M. Kabanov (see Lemma 3.5 in [39]) which gives relative sequential
compactness, in the Cesa`ro sense, of any minimizing sequence. Then, exploiting again the
lower semi-continuity and the convexity of the cost functions, we conclude existence of the
minima. Next, we show that the best reply maps preserve the order in the spaces of admissible
strategies, and for this the submodular condition is essential. The existence result then follows
by invoking Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
Our finding also generalizes also to the infinite time-horizon case and to the monotone-
follower game in which players are allowed to choose both a regular control and a singular
control. Moreover, some of the assumptions can be removed if we impose finite fuel constraints.
It is worth stressing that our proof strongly hinges on the submodularity assumption, which
is, however, a typical requirement in many problems arising in applications (see, e.g., [56], [57],
[67], [69], the more recent [6] and [7], or the books [68] and [70] and the references therein).
The approximation results. Singular control problems naturally arise to overcome the ill-
posedness of standard stochastic control problems in which the control affects linearly the
dynamics of the state variable, and the cost of control is proportional to the effort. Some kind
of connection between regular control problems with the linear structure described above and
singular control problems is then expected, and actually already discussed in the literature
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(see, e.g, the early [51] and [52] for an analytical approach, and [47] for a probabilistic ap-
proach). In Theorem 21 of [47], it is shown that any sequence obtained by choosing, for each
n ∈ N, a minimizer of the monotone-follower problem when the class of admissible controls is
restricted to the set of n-Lipschitz controls, suitably approximates a (weak) optimal solution
to the original monotone-follower problem.
In our game-setting, we prove that any sequence of Nash equilibria of the n-Lipschitz game
is weakly relatively compact, and that any accumulation point is a weak Nash equilibrium of
the monotone-follower game. We first show that this sequence satisfies a tightness criterion
for the Meyer-Zheng topology. Then, we prove that any Nash equilibrium of the n-Lipschitz
game necessarily satisfies a system of stochastic equations. After changing the underlying
probability space by a Skorokhod representation, we pass to the limit in these systems of
equations and we deduce that any accumulation point solves a new system of stochastic equa-
tions. These equations can be viewed as a version of the Pontryagin maximum principle, and
they are sufficient to ensure that the limit point is a Nash equilibrium in the new probability
space, hence a weak Nash equilibrium.
As a byproduct of this result, we are able to show that, for each ε > 0, there exists n ∈ N
large enough such that the Nash equilibrium of the n-Lipschitz game is an ε-Nash equilibrium
of the monotone-follower game. This gives a clearer interpretation of the weak Nash equilib-
rium found through the approximation: the N -dimensional vector whose components are the
expected costs associated to the weak Nash equilibrium is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium payoff
(as defined in [17]) of the monotone-follower game.
Applications and examples. Our existence result applies to deduce existence of open-loop
Nash equilibria in stochastic differential games with singular controls and non-Markovian
random costs, whenever a certain structure is preserved by the dynamics. For the sake of
illustration, we consider the case in which the dynamics of the state variable of each player are
a linearly controlled geometric Brownian motion and a linearly controlled Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
process.
Moreover, we consider the algorithm introduced by Topkis (see Algorithm II in [67]) for
submodular games: given as initial point the constantly null profile strategy, this algorithm
consists of an iteration of the best reply map. We show that, also in our setting with singular
controls, this algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium.
1.3. Organization of the paper. In Section 2.1 we introduce the monotone-follower game.
Sections 2.2 and 3 are devoted to the existence theorems of Nash equilibria for the submod-
ular monotone-follower game and for the n-Lipschitz game, respectively. The approximation
results are contained in Section 4. The application of our result to suitable stochastic differ-
ential games is provided in Section 5, together with the proof of the convergence to a Nash
equilibrium of a certain algorithm. Section 6 contains an extension of the existence result
to games with both regular and singular controls. In Appendix A we collect some technical
lemmata and some proofs of results from Section 4, while Appendix B is devoted to recall
some results about the Meyer-Zheng topology.
2. The Monotone-Follower Game
2.1. Definition of the Monotone-Follower Game. Fix a complete probability space
(Ω,F ,P), a finite time horizon T ∈ (0,∞), an integer N ≥ 2 and k, d ∈ N. Consider a
stochastic process L : Ω × [0, T ] → Rk, and, for i = 1, ..., N , assume to be given continuous
semimartingales f i : Ω×[0, T ]→ Rd+, and set f := (f1, ..., fN ). Denote by F¯f,L+ = {F¯f,Lt+ }t∈[0,T ]
the right-continuous extension of the filtration generated by f and L, augmented by the P-null
sets.
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Define the space of admissible strategies
(2.1) A :=
{
V : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rd
∣∣∣∣ V is an F¯f,L+ -adapted ca`dla`g process, withnondecreasing and nonnegative components
}
,
and let AN := ⊗Ni=1A denote the set of admissible profile strategies. In order to avoid
confusion, in the following we will denote profile strategies in bold letters.
For each i = 1, ..., N , consider measurable functions hi, gi : Rk × RNd → [0,∞). We define
the monotone-follower game as the game in which each player i ∈ {1, ..., N} is allowed to
choose an admissible strategy Ai ∈ A in order to minimize the cost functional
J i(Ai, A−i) :=E[Ci(f, L,A)] := E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt,At) dt+ g
i(LT ,AT ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i
t
]
,(2.2)
where A−i := (Aj)j 6=i and A := (Ai, A−i) ∈ AN . Here and in the sequel the integrals with
respect to Ai are defined by∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i
t := f
i
0A
i
0 +
∫ T
0
f it dA
i
t =
d∑
`=1
f `,i0 A
`,i
0 +
d∑
`=1
∫ T
0
f `t dA
`,i
t ,
where the integrals on the right hand side are intended in the standard Lebesgue-Stieltjes
sense on the interval (0, T ].
We recall the notion of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1. An admissible profile strategy A¯ ∈ AN is a Nash equilibrium if, for every
i = 1, ..., N , we have J i(A¯) <∞ and
J i(A¯i, A¯−i) ≤ J i(V i, A¯−i), for every V i ∈ A.
Letting 2A denote the set of all subset of A, for each i = 1, ..., N define the best reply map
Ri : AN → 2A by
(2.3) Ri(A) := arg min
V i∈A
J i(V i, A−i).
Moreover define the map
(2.4) R := (R1, ..., RN ) : AN →
N⊗
i=1
2A,
and notice that the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of fixed points of the map R;
that is, the set of A¯ ∈ AN such that A¯ ∈ R(A¯).
Remark 2.1. The notion of equilibrium introduced above is that of the so-called Open-Loop
Nash equilibrium. We focus on this specific class of equilibria since serious conceptual –so far
unsolved – problems arise when one tries to define a game of singular controls with Closed-
Loop strategies (see [5] for a discussion, and also [30] and [65]).
In the rest of this paper, for m ∈ N and x, y ∈ Rm, we denote by xy the scalar product in
Rm, as well as by | · | the Euclidean norm in Rm. For x, y ∈ Rm and c ∈ R, we will write x ≤ y
if x` ≤ y` for each ` = 1, ...,m, as well as x ≤ c if x` ≤ c for each ` = 1, ...,m. Moreover, we set
x∧ y := (x1 ∧ y1, ..., xm ∧ ym) and x∨ y := (x1 ∨ y1, ..., xm ∨ ym), where x` ∧ y` := min{x`, y`}
and x` ∨ y` := max{x`, y`} for each ` = 1, ...,m.
We now specify the structural hypothesis on the costs.
Assumption 2.2. For each i = 1, ..., N , assume that:
(1) for each (l, a−i) ∈ Rk × R(N−1)d, the functions hi(l, ·, a−i) and gi(l, ·, a−i) are lower
semi-continuous, and strictly convex;
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(2) for each l ∈ Rk the functions hi(l, ·, ·) and gi(l, ·, ·) have decreasing differences in
(ai, a−i), i.e.
hi(l, a¯i, a−i)− hi(l, ai, a−i) ≥ hi(l, a¯i, a¯−i)− hi(l, ai, a¯−i),
gi(l, a¯i, a−i)− gi(l, ai, a−i) ≥ gi(l, a¯i, a¯−i)− gi(l, ai, a¯−i),
for each a, a¯ ∈ RNd such that a¯ ≥ a;
(3) for each (l, a−i) ∈ Rk×R(N−1)d, the functions hi(l, ·, a−i) and gi(l, ·, a−i) are submod-
ular, i.e.
hi(l, a¯i, a−i) + hi(l, ai, a−i) ≥ hi(l, a¯i ∧ ai, a−i) + hi(l, a¯i ∨ ai, a−i),
gi(l, a¯i, a−i) + gi(l, ai, a−i) ≥ gi(l, a¯i ∧ ai, a−i) + gi(l, a¯i ∨ ai, a−i),
for each a, a¯ ∈ RNd.
Under Conditions 2 and 3 of Assumption 2.2 we refer to the game introduced above as to
the submodular monotone-follower game (see [67] for a static deterministic N -player game
submodular game). The submodular structure of our game will play a fundamental role in
the following.
Remark 2.3. Condition 3 of Assumption 2.2 is verified if and only if, for each (l, a−i) ∈ Rk×
R(N−1)d and ` = 1, ..., d, hi(l, ·, a−i) and gi(l, ·, a−i) have decreasing differences in (a`,i, a−`,i),
where a−`,i = (aj,i)j 6=` (see Theorem 2.6.1 and Corollary 2.6.1 at p. 44 in [68]). Hence, in
the case of twice-differentiable functions, this condition corresponds to the nonpositivity of the
second order mixed derivatives; that is
∂2hi
∂a`,i∂aj,i
≤ 0 and ∂
2gi
∂a`,i∂aj,i
≤ 0 for each i = 1, ..., N and ` 6= j.
2.2. Existence of Nash Equilibria in the Submodular Monotone-Follower Game.
On the space of admissible strategies A (cf. Definition 2.1) we define the order relation 4 such
that, for V,U ∈ A, one has
V 4 U ⇐⇒ Vt ≤ Ut ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
Moreover, we can endow the space A with a lattice structure, defining the processes V ∧ U
and V ∨ U as
(V ∧ U)t := Vt ∧ Ut and (V ∨ U)t := Vt ∨ Ut ∀t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
In the same way, on the set of profile strategies AN , define, for A,B ∈ AN , an order relation
4N by
A 4N B ⇐⇒ Ai 4 Bi ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N},
together with the lattice structure
A ∧B := (A1 ∧B1, ..., AN ∧BN ) and A ∨B := (A1 ∨B1, ..., AN ∨BN ).
We now provide an existence result for the submodular monotone-follower game.
Theorem 2.4. Let Assumption 2.2 hold and assume that the following uniform coercivity
condition is satisfied: there exist two constants K,κ > 0 such that, for each i = 1, ..., N ,
(2.5) J i(Ai, A−i) ≥ κE[|AiT |] for all A ∈ AN with E[|AiT |] ≥ K.
Suppose, moreover, that there exists a constant M > 0 such that, for each i = 1, ..., N ,
(2.6) for all A ∈ AN there exists ri(A) ∈ A such that J i(ri(A), A−i) ≤M.
Then the set of Nash equilibria F ⊂ AN is non empty, and the partially ordered set (F,4N )
is a complete lattice.
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Proof. Our aim is to prove existence of a Nash equilibrium by applying Tarski’s fixed point
theorem (see [66], Theorem 1) to the map R (cf. (2.4)). For this, the assumption on the
submodularity of hi and gi will play a crucial role.
First of all, recalling k, K and M from (2.5) and (2.6), define the constant w := 2Mκ ∨K,
and introduce the set of restricted admissible strategies
(2.7) A(w) := {A ∈ A |E[AlT ] ≤ w, ∀ l = 1, ..., d },
and the set of restricted profile strategies as A(w)N := ⊗Ni=1A(w). In the following steps we
will identify the proper framework allowing us to apply Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
(Step 1) The lattices (A(w)N ,4N ) and (A(w),4) are complete.
We prove the claim only for the lattice (A(w)N ,4N ), since an analogous rationale applies to
show that the lattice (A(w),4) is complete.
To prove that the lattice (A(w)N ,4N ) is complete we have to show that each subset of
A(w)N has a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound. We now prove only the existence
of a least upper bound, since the existence of a greatest lower bound follows by similar
arguments.
Consider a subset {Aj}j∈I of A(w)N , where I is a set of indexes. We want to show that
there exists an element S of A(w)N such that Aj 4N S for each j ∈ I and such that, if B is
another element of A(w)N with Aj 4N B for each j ∈ I, then S 4N B.
Define Q := ([0, T ] ∩Q) ∪ {T}. For each q ∈ Q we set
(2.8) S˜q := ess sup
j∈I
Ajq,
and we recall that there exists a countable subset Iq of I such that
(2.9) S˜q = sup
j∈Iq
Ajq.
Define next the right-continuous process S : Ω× [0, T ]→ [0,∞)Nd by
(2.10) ST := S˜T , and St := inf{ S˜q | q > t, q ∈ Q}, for t < T.
Observe that, being ST = supj∈IT A
j
T P-a.s., by Fatou’s lemma it follows that E[S
`,i
T ] ≤ w for
each l = 1, ..., d and i = 1, ..., N ; that is, S ∈ AN . Moreover, S is adapted to F¯f,L+ . Indeed, by
its definition, ST is clearly F¯f,LT -measurable. On the other hand, if t < T , for a generic q¯ ∈ Q
with q¯ > t, we have that
St = inf{ S˜q | q > t, q ∈ Q} = inf{ S˜q | t < q ≤ q¯, q ∈ Q},
where we have used that the process {S˜q}q∈Q is increasing. Since the right-hand side of the
latter equation is F¯f,Lq¯ -measurable, we deduce that St is F¯f,Lq¯ -measurable for each q¯ > t, and
this implies, by the right-continuity of F¯f,L+ , that St is F¯f,Lt -measurable. Finally, since S is
clearly increasing, nonnegative and right-continuous, we conclude that S ∈ A(w)N .
Take now j ∈ I. From the definition (2.8) of S˜, for each q ∈ Q we have Ajq ≤ S˜q P-a.s.,
which means that there exists a P-null set Nq such that Ajq(ω) ≤ S˜q(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω \ Nq.
Defining then the P-null set N := ⋃q∈QNq, we have Ajq(ω) ≤ S˜q(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω \ N and
q ∈ Q, which, by right-continuity, in turn implies that Ajt (ω) ≤ St(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω \N and
t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence, Aj 4N S for each j ∈ I as desired.
Consider next an element B of A(w)N such that Aj 4N B for each j ∈ I. For q ∈ Q
and j ∈ Iq there exists a P-null set Mjq such that Ajq(ω) ≤ Bq(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω \ Mjq.
Defining then Mq :=
⋃
j∈IqM
j
q, we have A
j
q(ω) ≤ Bq(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω \ Mq and j ∈ Iq,
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which, by (2.9), implies that S˜q(ω) ≤ Bq(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω \ Mq. Finally, introducing the
P-null set M := ⋃q∈QMq, we have S˜q(ω) ≤ Bq(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω \ M and q ∈ Q, and, by
right-continuity, we deduce that S 4N B.
(Step 2) The best reply maps Ri : AN → A(w) are well defined.
Fix i and take A ∈ AN . We have to prove that there exists a unique B ∈ A such that
J i(B,A−i) = min
V ∈A
J i(V,A−i),
and, moreover, that B ∈ A(w). Clearly, by (2.3), we have B = {Ri(A)t}t∈[0,T ].
Let {V j}j∈N ⊂ A be a minimizing sequence for the functional J i(·, A−i). Fix δ > 0 and,
for each j ∈ N, let V˜ j denote
V˜ jt :=
{
0 if t ∈ [−δ, 0)
V jt if t ∈ [0, T ].
Thanks to the coercivity conditions (2.5) on the costs, we deduce that
sup
j∈N
E[|V˜ jT |] = sup
j∈N
E[|V jT |] <∞.
We can then use (a minimal adjustment to [−δ, T ] of) Lemma 3.5 in [39], to find a ca`dla`g,
nondecreasing, nonnegative, F¯f,L+ -adapted process B, and a subsequence of {V˜ j}j∈N (not
relabeled) such that, P-a.s.,
(2.11) lim
m
∫ T
−δ
ϕt dB
m
t =
∫ T
−δ
ϕt dBt ∀ϕ ∈ Cb((−δ, T );Rd) and lim
m
BmT = BT ,
where we set, P-a.s.
(2.12) Bmt :=
1
m
m∑
j=1
V˜ jt , ∀t ∈ [−δ, T ].
For each test functions ϕ ∈ Cb((−δ, T );Rd) with compact support contained in (−δ, 0), defin-
ing Φt :=
∫ t
0 ϕs ds, we find, P-a.s.,
∫ T
−δ Φt dBt = −
∫ T
−δ ϕtBt dt = 0. This implies, by the
fundamental lemma of Calculus of Variations (see Theorem 1.24 at p. 26 in [25]), that
P[Bt = 0, ∀t ∈ (−δ, 0)] = 1 and hence, by right-continuity, that P[Bt = 0, ∀t ∈ [−δ, 0)] = 1.
Hence, we can write
J i(B,A−i) =E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, Bt, A
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , BT , A
−i
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dBt
]
(2.13)
= E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, Bt, A
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , BT , A
−i
T ) +
∫ T
−δ
f it dBt
]
.
Moreover, from the limit in (2.11) we have that there exists a P-null set N such that, for each
ω ∈ Ω \ N there exists a subset I(ω) ⊂ [−δ, T ) of null Lebesgue measure, such that
lim
m
Bmt (ω) = Bt(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω \ N and t ∈ [−δ, T ] \ I(ω).
The latter convergence, allows us to invoke Fatou’s lemma and to deduce that
J i(B,A−i) ≤ lim inf
m
E
[∫ T
0
hi(Lt, B
m
t , A
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , B
m
T , A
−i
T ) +
∫ T
−δ
f it dB
m
t
]
,
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upon using the lower semi-continuity of the costs and equation (2.13). Finally, thanks to the
convexity of hi and gi and to the minimizing property of V j , from the last inequality we can
conclude that
J i(B,A−i) ≤ lim inf
m
1
m
m∑
j=1
E
[∫ T
0
hi(Lt, V˜
j
t , A
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , V˜
j
T , A
−i
T ) +
∫ T
−δ
f it dV˜
j
t
]
= lim inf
m
1
m
m∑
j=1
E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, V
j
t , A
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , V
j
T , A
−i
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dV
j
t
]
= lim inf
m
1
m
m∑
j=1
J i(V j , A−i)
= min
V ∈A
J i(V,A−i).
The latter yields that B is a minimizer for J i(·, A−i). In fact, B is the unique minimizer of
J i(·, A−i) by strict convexity of the costs.
It remains to prove that B ∈ A(w), and to accomplish that we argue by contradiction. If
there exists l ∈ {1, ..., d} such that E[BlT ] ≥ w = 2Mκ ∨K, then we have E[|BT |] ≥ 2Mκ ∨K
and hence, by the coercivity condition (2.5) together with (2.6), we deduce that
J i(B,A−i) ≥ κE[|BT |] ≥ 2M > J i(ri(A), A−i),
which contradicts the optimality of B.
(Step 3) The best reply maps Ri are increasing, i.e. if A, A¯ ∈ AN are such that A 4N A¯,
then Ri(A) 4 Ri(A¯).
First of all, observe that, by an integration by parts (see, e.g., Corollary 2 at p. 68 in [60]),
the cost functional rewrites as
J i(Ai, A−i) = E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt,At) dt+ g
i (LT ,AT )−
∫ T
0
Ait− df
i
t + f
i
TA
i
T
]
,(2.14)
where Ait− denotes the left-limit of Ait. Thanks to the optimality of Ri(A) we have the
inequality
(2.15) J i(Ri(A¯) ∧Ri(A), A−i)− J i(Ri(A),A−i) ≥ 0,
which by (2.14) and setting Ri := Ri(A) and R¯i := Ri(A¯), can be rewritten as
E
[∫ T
0
(
hi(Lt, R
i
t ∧ R¯it, A−it )− hi(Lt, Rit, A−it )
)
dt
]
+ E
[
gi(LT , R
i
T ∧ R¯iT , A−iT )− gi(LT , RiT , A−iT )
]
− E
[∫ T
0
(Rit− ∧ R¯it− −Rit−) df it
]
+ E
[
f iT (R
i
T ∧ R¯iT −RiT )
] ≥ 0,
By the submodularity Condition 3 in Assumption 2.2, we have
E
[∫ T
0
(
hi(Lt, R
i
t ∧ R¯it, A−it )− hi(Lt, Rit, A−it )
)
dt
]
(2.16)
≤ E
[∫ T
0
(
hi(Lt, R¯
i
t, A
−i
t )− hi(Lt, Rit ∨ R¯it, A−it )
)
dt
]
,
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and
E
[
gi(LT , R
i
T ∧ R¯iT , A−iT )− gi(LT , RiT , A−iT )
]
(2.17)
≤ E [gi(LT , R¯iT , A−iT )− gi(LT , RiT ∨ R¯iT , A−iT )] .
Moreover, one can easily verify that
(2.18) E
[∫ T
0
(Rit− ∧ R¯it− −Rit−) df it
]
= E
[∫ T
0
(R¯it− −Rit− ∨ R¯it−) df it
]
and
(2.19) E
[
f iT (R
i
T ∧ R¯iT −RiT )
]
= E
[
f iT (R¯
i
T −RiT ∨ R¯iT )
]
.
Using (2.16)-(2.19) we obtain
J i(Ri(A¯) ∧Ri(A), A−i)− J i(Ri(A), A−i) ≤ J i(Ri(A¯), A−i)− J i(Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯), A−i),
so that, by (2.15), we deduce that
(2.20) J i(Ri(A¯), A−i)− J i(Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯), A−i) ≥ 0.
Now, by Condition 2 in Assumption 2.2, we have
J i(Ri(A¯), A¯−i)− J i(Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯), A¯−i) ≥ J i(Ri(A¯), A−i)− J i(Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯), A−i),
and finally, by (2.20), we conclude that
J i(Ri(A¯), A¯−i)− J i(Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯), A¯−i) ≥ 0.
Hence Ri(A) ∨ Ri(A¯) minimizes J i(·, A¯−i) as well as Ri(A¯) and, by uniqueness, it must be
Ri(A) ∨Ri(A¯) = Ri(A¯). That is Ri(A¯) 4 Ri(A), which shows the claimed monotonicity.
(Step 5) Existence of Nash equilibria.
By the previous steps the lattice (A(w)N ,4N ) is complete and the restriction of the map R
(cf. (2.4)) to the set of restricted profile strategies A(w)N into itself is monotone increasing.
Then, by Tarski’s fixed point theorem (see [66], Theorem 1), the set of fixed point of the map
R is a non empty complete lattice. Since such a set coincides with the set of Nash equilibria,
the proof is completed. 
2.3. Some Remarks. In this subsection we collect some remarks concerning assumptions
and extensions of the previous theorem.
Remark 2.5 (Comments on the Conditions of Theorem 2.4). A few comments are worth
being done.
(1) Condition (2.5) is satisfied if, for example, there exists a constant c > 0 such that
P
[
f it ≥ c, ∀i = 1, ..., N, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]
]
= 1,
or if gi are such that gi(l, ai, a−i) ≥ κ |ai|.
(2) The role of Condition (2.6) is to force Nash equilibria, whenever they exist, to live in
the bounded subset AN (w) of AN . If there exist measurable functions H,G : Rk →
[0,∞) such that, for each i = 1, ..., N and for each (l, a−i) ∈ Rk × R(N−1)d, we have
hi(l, 0, a−i) ≤ H(l) and gi(l, 0, a−i) ≤ G(l), with
E
[∫ T
0
H(Ls) ds+G(LT )
]
<∞,
then Condition (2.6) is satisfies with ri(A) = 0.
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Remark 2.6. Consider the case N = 2, d = 1. The costs relative to Player 1 are f1 = h1 =
0, g1(l, a1, a2) = e−a1(2−e−a2), while the costs of Player 2 can be generic functions satisfying
our requirements. Then, all the assumptions of Theorem 2.4 are satisfied, with the exception
of the coercivity condition (2.5), which is not satisfied by J 1. If now (Aˆ1, Aˆ2) were a Nash
equilibrium, then for the first player we could write
0 < E[e−Aˆ
1
T (2− e−Aˆ2T )] ≤ inf
n∈N
E[e−n(2− e−Aˆ2T )] = 0,
which is clearly a contradiction. This example shows that, at least in the Nash equilibria, the
coercivity condition (2.5) is necessarily satisfied.
Remark 2.7 (Finite-Fuel Constraint). Many models in the literature on monotone-follower
problems enjoy a so-called finite fuel constraint (see e.g. [41] for a seminal paper, and the more
recent [8] and [24]). This can be realized by requiring that the admissible control strategies stay
bounded either P-a.s. or in expectation. In our game, if we suppose that, for each i = 1, ..., N ,
the strategies of player i belongs to the set
A(wi) := {A ∈ A |E[AlT ] ≤ wi, ∀ l = 1, ..., d },
a proof similar to that of Theorem 2.4 still shows existence of Nash equilibria without need of
Conditions 2.5 and 2.6.
Remark 2.8. Theorem 2.4 still holds if we relax the condition of nonnegative costs and
we allow the functions hi and gi to assume values in R, but requiring, however, conditions
ensuring that
inf
V ∈A
J i(V,A−i) > −∞ for all A−i ∈ AN−1 such that E[|A−iT |] ≤
2M
κ
∨K.
This allows also to apply the Theorem 2.4 in the case in which players aim at maximizing
expected net profit functionals.
Remark 2.9 (Infinite Time-Horizon Case: T = ∞). Theorem 2.4 can be proved also in the
case T =∞. Indeed, we can consider the problem in which each player chooses a strategy in
the set
A[0,∞) =
{
A : [0,∞)× Ω→ [0,∞)d
∣∣∣∣ A is an F¯f,L+ -adapted ca`dla`g process, withnondecreasing and nonnegative components
}
,
in order to minimize the cost functional
J i∞(Ai, A−i) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
hi(Lt,At) dt+
∫
[0,∞)
f it dA
i
t
]
.
Then, the arguments developed in the previous proof carry on upon replacing AT with A∞ :=
supt∈[0,∞)At.
3. The n-Lipschitz Game
In the notation of Section 2, for each n ∈ N, define the space of n-Lipschitz strategies
L(n) = {A ∈ A |A is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant smaller that n and A0 = 0} ,
and the space of n-Lipschitz profile strategies as LN (n) := ⊗Ni=1 L(n). The set L(n) (resp.
LN (n)) inherits from A (resp. AN ) the order relation 4 (resp. 4N ) together with the associ-
ated lattice structure.
For each n ∈ N, the set of n-Lipschitz profile strategies LN (n), together with the cost
functionals J i, define a game to which we will refer to as the n-Lipschitz game. We say that
12 DIANETTI AND FERRARI
an n-Lipschitz profile strategy A ∈ LN (n) is a Nash equilibrium of the n-Lipschitz game if,
for each i = 1, ..., N , we have J i(A) <∞ and
J i(Ai, A−i) ≤ J i(V i, A−i), for every V i ∈ L(n).
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of Nash Equilibria for the Submodular n-Lipschitz Game). Let
Assumption 2.2 hold. Then, for each n ∈ N, the set of Nash equilibria of the n-Lipschitz
game F ⊂ LN (n) is non empty, and the partially ordered set (F,4N ) is a complete lattice.
Proof. The proof is organized in three steps.
(Step 1) The lattices (LN (n),4N ) and (L(n),4) are complete.
With regards to Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 2.4, we only have to show that the least upper
bound and a greatest lower bound of any subset of LN (n) still belongs to LN (n). We will show
now that for each set of indexes I and each subset {Aj}j∈I of LN (n), its least upper bound
S still lies in LN (n). Analogous arguments apply to show that the greatest lower bound of
any subset of LN (n) is still in LN (n).
Fix q, q¯ ∈ Q, with Q := (Q∩ [0, T ])∩{T}, such that q > q¯, recall S˜ from (2.8), and consider
a countable subset Iq of I for which
S˜q = sup
h∈Iq
Ahq .
We then have, P-a.s.,
S˜q − S˜q¯ = sup
h∈Iq
(
Ahq − ess sup
j∈I
Ajq¯
)
≤ sup
h∈Iq
(
Ahq −Ahq¯
)
≤ n |q − q¯|,
and, since S˜ in nondecreasing, we conclude that |S˜q − S˜q¯| ≤ n |q − q¯|, P-a.s. Therefore, since
Q is countable, recalling the definition of S given in (2.10), we deduce that S is Lipschitz
continuous with Lipschitz constant bounded by n.
(Step 2) The best reply maps Ri : LN (n)→ L(n) (cf. (2.3)) are well defined.
Fix i and take A ∈ LN (n). We apply the classical direct method to find V¯ ∈ L(n) such that
J i(V¯ , A−i) = min
V ∈L(n)
J i(V,A−i).
Take a minimizing sequence {V j}j∈N ⊂ L(n). Since, for each j ∈ N, we have that V j
is Lipschitz, we can define P ⊗ dt-a.e. the time derivative of V j ; that is, the F-progressively
measurable Rd-valued process vjt := dV
j
t /dt. Since the sequence {vj}j∈N is bounded in L2(Ω×
[0, T ];Rd) (as any of its elements is bounded by n), by Banach-Saks’ theorem (see, e.g., p. 314
of [62]) we can extract a subsequence (still denoted by j) whose Cesa`ro sums {cj}j∈N converge
strongly in L2(Ω× [0, T ];Rd) to some F¯f,L+ -progressively measurable v¯ ∈ L2(Ω× [0, T ];Rd). By
passing to another subsequence {cjm}m∈N we can assume that {cjm}m∈N converges P⊗dt-a.e.
to v¯, which allows to conclude that v¯t ∈ [0, n]d, P⊗ dt-a.e.
Define then V¯t :=
∫ t
0 v¯s ds, and observe that, by the properties of v¯, we have V¯ ∈ L(n).
Also, P-a.s.,
∫ t
0 c
jm
s ds converges to V¯t for each t ∈ [0, T ], and the convexity of J i(·, A−i)
guarantees that the sequence {∫ ·0 cjms ds}j∈N is still minimizing. Hence, thanks to the lower
semi-continuity and the convexity of hi and gi, and to Fatou’s lemma, we can conclude that
J i(V¯ , A−i) = J i(lim
m
∫ ·
0 c
jm , A−i) ≤ lim inf
m
J i(∫ ·0 cjm , A−i) = min
V ∈L(n)
J i(V,A−i).
The latter yields that V¯ minimizes J i(·, A−i). In fact, V¯ is the unique minimizer of J i(·, A−i)
by strict convexity of the costs.
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(Step 3) Existence of Nash equilibria.
By employing arguments as those in Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 2.4 we can deduce
that the best reply map R = (R1, ..., RN ) : LN (n) → LN (n) is monotone increasing in the
complete lattice (LN (n),4N ). Then, the thesis of the theorem follows from Tarski’s fixed
point theorem. 
4. Existence and Approximation of Weak Nash Equilibria in the Submodular
Monotone-Follower Game
In this section we will investigate connections between the monotone-follower game and the
n-Lipschitz games.
4.1. Weak Formulation of the Monotone-Follower Game. For T ∈ (0,∞) and an
arbitrary m ∈ N, we introduce the following measurable spaces:
• Cm+ denotes the set of Rm-valued continuous function on [0, T ] with nonnegative com-
ponents, endowed with the Borel σ-algebra generated by the uniform convergence
norm;
• Dm denotes the Skorokhod space of Rm-valued ca`dla`g functions, defined on [0, T ],
endowed with the Borel σ-algebra generated by the Skorokhod topology;
• Dm↑ denotes the Skorokhod space of Rm-valued nondecreasing, nonnegative ca`dla`g
functions, defined on [0, T ], endowed with the Borel σ-algebra generated by the Sko-
rokhod topology.
We refer to Chapter 3 in [13] for more details on the Skorokhod space. Also, let P(Cm+ ),
P(Dm) and P(Dm↑ ) denote the set of probability measures on the Borel σ-algebras of Cm+ , Dm
and Dm↑ , respectively. Finally, denote by P(Cm+ ×Dm ×Dm↑ ) the set of probability measures
on the product σ-algebra.
Moreover, denote by (pif , piL) : CNd+ × Dk × [0, T ] → RNd+k the canonical projection, i.e.,
set (pif , piL)t(f, L) = (ft, Lt) for each (f, L) ∈ CNd+ ×Dk and t ∈ [0, T ]. Also, for a probability
measure P ∈ P(CNd+ × Dk), denote by F¯pif ,piL+ the right continuous extension of the filtration
on CNd+ ×Dk generated by the canonical projections pif and piL, augmented by the P-null sets.
We now give a weak formulation of the monotone-follower game. Assume to be given a
distribution P0 ∈ P(CNd+ ×Dk) such that the projection process pif : CNd+ ×Dk× [0, T ]→ RNd
is a semimartingale with respect to the filtration F¯pif ,piL+ .
Definition 2. We call a basis a 5-tuple β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L) such that (Ω,F ,P) is a complete
probability space, L is an Rk-valued ca`dla`g process, f = (f1, ..., fN ) is an RNd-valued contin-
uous, nonnegative semimartingale with respect to the filtration F¯f,L+ , and P ◦ (f, L)−1 = P0.
For each basis β, we then give the relative notion of admissible strategy.
Definition 3. Given a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L), an admissible strategy associated to β is an
Rd-valued ca`dla`g, nondecreasing, nonnegative process on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). We
denote by Aβ the set of admissible strategies associated to the basis β. Moreover, we define
the space of admissible profile strategies associated to the basis β as ANβ :=
⊗N
i=1Aβ.
Given a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L), for each i ∈ {1, ..., N} and each admissible strategy
Ai ∈ Aβ we define the cost functionals
J iβ(Ai, A−i) := EP[Ci(f, L,A)] = EP
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt,At) dt+ g
i(LT ,AT ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i
t
]
,(4.1)
where A−i := (Aj)j 6=i, A := (Ai, A−i) and EP denotes the expectation under the probability
measure P.
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We finally introduce a notion of equilibrium that we will refer to as weak Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4 (Weak Nash Equilibrium). Given a basis β¯ and an admissible profile strategy
A¯ ∈ AN
β¯
, we say that the couple (β¯, A¯) is a weak Nash equilibrium if, for every i = 1, ..., N ,
we have
J iβ¯(A¯i, A¯−i) ≤ J iβ¯(V i, A¯−i), for every V i ∈ Aβ¯.
4.2. Assumptions and Preliminary Lemmata. In this subsection we specify the main
assumptions of this section, we introduce some notations, and we provide some preliminary
lemmata.
Assumption 4.1. Let Assumption 2.2 hold and, for each i = 1, ..., N , assume that
(1) gi and hi are continuous and continuously differentiable in the variable ai ∈ Rd;
(2) there exist γ1, γ2 > 1 such that the d-dimensional gradients ∇ihi and ∇igi of the
functions hi and gi with respect to the (d-dimensional) variable ai satisfy
(4.2) |∇ihi(l, a)|+ |∇igi(l, a)| ≤ C(1 + |l|γ1 + |a|γ2),
for each l ∈ Rk and a = (a1, ..., aN ) ∈ RNd.
Moreover, there exist measurable functions H i, Gi : Rk → R such that hi(l, 0, a−i) ≤
H i(l) and gi(l, 0, a−i) ≤ Gi(l), with
(4.3) EP0
[∫ T
0
|H i((piL)s)|q ds+ |Gi((piL)T )|q
]
<∞
and
(4.4) EP0
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
(|(piL)s|αγ1p + |(pif )s|αp )
]
<∞,
where q := αmax{γ2 p, p/(p− 1)} for some p, α > 1;
(3) there exists a constant c > 0 such that
(4.5) P0
[
(pif )
i
t ≥ c, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], ∀ i = 1, ..., N
]
= 1,
and the total conditional variation (see definition (B.3) in the Appendix B) of piL over
the interval [0, T ] is finite; that is, V P0T (piL) <∞ .
The following lemma will be useful in our subsequent analysis. It exploits the convexity of
hi and gi in order to obtain a subgradient inequality. The arguments of its proof are similar
to those already employed in [9], [30] and [65], but we provide a proof in Appendix A for the
sake of completeness.
Lemma 4.2. Let β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L) be a basis and take a profile strategy A = (A1, ..., AN ) ∈
ANβ such that J i(A) <∞ for i = 1, ..., N . For each i and each Bi ∈ Aβ we have
J iβ(Bi, A−i)− J iβ(Ai, A−i) ≥ EP
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Y it (dB
i
t − dAit)
]
where we define the (non adapted) process
(4.6) Y it :=
∫ T
t
∇ihi(Lt, Ait, A−it ) dt+∇igi(LT , AiT , A−iT ) + f it , t ∈ [0, T ].
Fix a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L) and denote by F¯f,L+ = {F¯f,Lt+ }t∈[0,T ] the right-continuous
extension of the filtration generated by f and L, augmented by the P-null sets. For each
n ∈ N, consider a Nash equilibrium An = (A1,n, ..., AN,n) of the n-Lipschitz game as in
Theorem 3.1. The next lemma shows that any Nash equilibria of the n-Lipschtz game satisfy
certain first order conditions. Its proof follows arguments analogus to that in the proof of
Proposition 27 in [47], and it is postponed to Appendix A.
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Lemma 4.3. Define, for every n ∈ N and every i = 1, ..., N , the (non adapted) continuous
process
(4.7) Y i,nt :=
∫ T
t
∇ihi(Lt,Ant ) dt+∇igi(LT ,AnT ) + f it , t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
Then, under Assumption 4.1, we have
(4.8) EP
[∫ T
0
Y i,nt dA
i,n
t
]
= −nEP
[∫ T
0
(Y i,nt )
− 1 dt
]
where 1 := (1, ..., 1) ∈ Rd, and
(4.9) lim
n
EP
[∫ T
0
(Y i,nt )
− dt
]
= 0.
4.3. Existence and Approximation of Weak Nash Equilibria. We now state and prove
the main result of this section.
For an arbitrary m ∈ N, consider on the space Cm+ the topology given by the convergence in
the uniform norm. Furthermore, on the space Dm consider the pseudopath topology τTpp; that
is, the topology on Dm induced by the convergence in the measure dt + δT on the interval
[0, T ], where dt denotes the Lebesgue measure, and δT denotes the Dirac measure at the
terminal time T . The space Dm↑ is a closed subset of the topological space (Dm, τTpp), and
the Borel σ-algebra induced by the topology τTpp, coincides with the σ-algebra induced by
the Skorokhod topology (see also the Appendix in [47]). Notice that the topological spaces
(Dm, τTpp) and (Dm↑ , τTpp) are separable, but not Polish (see, e.g., [54]). Finally, on the product
space CNd+ ×Dk ×DNd↑ , consider the product topology, and on P(CNd+ ×Dk ×DNd↑ ) consider
the topology of weak convergence of probability measures.
Fix a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L) and consider, for each n ∈ N, a Nash equilibrium An =
(A1,n, ..., AN,n) of the n-Lipschitz game as in Theorem 3.1. Define, for n ∈ N, the law
Pn := P◦ (f, L,An)−1 in P(CNd+ ×Dk×DNd↑ ); with a slight abuse of terminology, we will refer
to the law Pn as the law of the Nash equilibrium An. We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. Under Assumption 4.1 the following statements hold.
(1) The sequence {Pn}n∈N of the laws of the Nash equilibria of the n-Lipschitz games is
weakly relatively compact in P(CNd+ ×Dk ×DNd↑ ).
(2) Any accumulation point P¯ is the law of a weak Nash equilibrium of the monotone-
follower game; that is, there exist a basis β¯ = (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯, f¯ , L¯) and an admissible profile
strategy A¯ ∈ AN
β¯
, such that (β¯, A¯) is a weak Nash equilibrium of the monotone-follower
game and P¯ = Q¯ ◦ (f¯ , L¯, A¯)−1.
Proof. We prove the two claims of the theorem separately.
Proof of Claim 1. By assumption we have V PT (L) <∞, and by Lemma A.1 in the Appendix
A we have
(4.10) sup
n
EP [|AnT |q] <∞,
where q > 1 is as in Assumption 4.1. Therefore, from Lemma B.2, we can deduce that the
sequence {An}n∈N is tight in P(DNd↑ ), and that L in tight in P(Dk). Moreover, since the space
CNd+ is Polish, P ◦ f−1 is regular, and hence f is tight in P(CNd+ ) (see, e.g., Remark 13.27 at p.
260 in [43]). This implies that the sequence {(f, L,An)}n∈N is tight in P(CNd+ ×Dk ×DNd↑ ).
By Prokhorov’s theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 13.29 at p. 261 in [43]), there exists a subse-
quence of indexes (still denoted by n) and a probability measure P¯ ∈ P(CNd+ ×Dk×DNd↑ ) such
that the sequence Pn converges weakly to P¯. The first claim of the theorem is thus proved.
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Proof of Claim 2. Thanks to an extension of Skorokhod’s theorem for separable spaces (see
Theorem 3 in [28]), there exists a probability space (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯), and, on it, a sequence
{(f¯n, L¯n, A¯n)}n∈N
of CNd+ ×Dk ×DNd↑ -valued random variables, and a CNd+ ×Dk ×DNd↑ -valued random variable
(f¯ , L¯, A¯), such that
(i) Q¯ ◦ (f¯n, L¯n, A¯n)−1 = Pn and Q¯ ◦ (f¯ , L¯, A¯)−1 = P¯;
(ii) for almost all ω ∈ Ω¯, we have
(4.11) sup
t∈[0,T ]
|f¯nt (ω)− f¯t(ω)| → 0,
as well as
(4.12) (L¯n(ω), A¯n(ω))→ (L¯(ω), A¯(ω)) in the Lebesgue measure dt on [0, T ],
and
(4.13) (L¯nT (ω), A¯
n
T (ω))→ (L¯T (ω), A¯T (ω)).
Define then β¯ := (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯, f¯ , L¯). Since P ◦ (f, L)−1 is constantly P0, then the same holds for
its limit; that is, Q¯ ◦ (f¯ , L¯)−1 = P0, and this implies that β¯ is a basis.
Now, for every i = 1, ...., N , we define on the probability space (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯) the sequence of
continuous processes {Y¯ i,n}n∈N by
(4.14) Y¯ i,nt :=
∫ T
t
∇ihi(L¯nt , A¯nt ) dt+∇igi(L¯nT , A¯nT ) + f¯ i,nt for t ∈ [0, T ],
as well as the process
(4.15) Y¯ it :=
∫ T
t
∇ihi(L¯t, A¯t) dt+∇igi(L¯T , A¯T ) + f¯ it for t ∈ [0, T ].
The following claims summarize two key properties of the processes Y¯ i and A¯ that will
guarantee that (β¯, A¯) is a weak Nash equilibrium as in Definition 4.
For every i = 1, ..., N , we now prove that the following hold Q¯-a.s.:
(2.a) Y¯ it ≥ 0 for every t ∈ [0, T ];
(2.b)
∫
[0,T ]
Y¯ it dA¯
i
t = 0.
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(Proof of 2.a) We begin by proving that Y¯ n → Y¯ in L1(Q¯⊗dt). For i = 1, ..., N , from Lemma
A.3 (see Appendix) we have that Q¯⊗ dt-a.e. Y¯ i,n converges to Y¯ i. Moreover, for p > 1 as in
Assumption 4.1, by the growth condition (4.2) we have that
EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y¯ i,nt |p
]
≤ EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
t
∇ihi(L¯nt , A¯nt ) dt+∇igi(L¯nT , A¯nT ) + f¯ i,nt
∣∣∣∣p]
≤ C˜ EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
1 + |L¯nt |γ1p + |A¯nt |γ2p + |f¯ i,nt |p
)]
≤ C˜ EQ¯
[
1 + |A¯nT |γ2p + sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
|L¯nt |γ1p + |f¯ i,nt |p
)]
(4.16)
≤ C˜
(
1 + EP[|AnT |γ2p] + EP0
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
|(piL)t|γ1p + |(pif )it|p
)])
,
where C˜ is a constant that may vary from line to line. Using then the integrability condition
(4.4) in Assumption 4.1 and the estimates (4.10) (recall that by assumption γ2p < q), we have
(4.17) sup
n
EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y¯ i,nt |p
]
<∞,
which implies that the sequence Y¯ i,n is uniformly integrable. From Theorem 6.25 at p. in
[43], we deduce then that Y¯ n → Y¯ in L1(Q¯ ⊗ dt). Now, from (4.9) in Lemma 4.3, we easily
find
0 = lim
n
EP
[∫ T
0
(Y i,nt )
− dt
]
= lim
n
EQ¯
[∫ T
0
(Y¯ i,nt )
− dt
]
= EQ¯
[∫ T
0
(Y¯ it )
− dt
]
,
and by continuity of Y¯ i we conclude that Q¯-a.s.
(4.18) Y¯ it ≥ 0 , ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], ∀ i = 1, ..., N.
(Proof of 2.b) Observe first that, by the convergence at the terminal point (4.13) together
with Fatou’s lemma and the estimate (4.10) we have
(4.19) EQ¯[|A¯T |q] ≤ sup
n
EQ¯[|A¯nT |q] = sup
n
EP[|AnT |q] <∞.
Furthermore, computations analogous to those employed in (4.16) yield
(4.20) EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y¯ i,nt |αp
]
≤ C˜
(
1 + EP[|AnT |αγ2p] + EP0
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
|(piL)t|αγ1p + |(pif )it|αp
)])
,
as well as,
(4.21) EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y¯ it |αp
]
≤ C˜
(
1 + EQ¯[|A¯T |αγ2p] + EP0
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(
|(piL)t|αγ1p + |(pif )it|αp
)])
.
Now, the estimates (4.10), (4.19), (4.20) and (4.21) implies that
sup
n
EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y¯ i,nt |αp + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y¯ it |αp + |A¯nT |
αp
p−1 + |A¯T |
αp
p−1
]
<∞,
which, together with the convergence established in Lemma A.3 in Appendix A, allows us to
use Lemma B.3 in Appendix B in order to deduce that
(4.22) EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Y¯ it dA¯
i
t
]
= lim
n
EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Y¯ i,nt dA¯
i,n
t
]
.
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Furthermore, since for each n ∈ N we have A¯i,n0 = 0 Q¯-a.s., thanks to (4.8) in Lemma 4.3 we
have that
EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Y¯
i,nj
t dA¯
i,nj
t
]
= EQ¯
[ ∫ T
0
Y¯
i,nj
t dA¯
i,nj
t
]
= EP
[ ∫ T
0
Y
i,nj
t dA
i,nj
t
]
≤ 0,
hence, due to (4.22), we deduce that
EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Y¯ it dA¯
i
t
]
≤ 0.
This implies, thanks to the non negativity of Y¯ i established in (2.a), that Q¯-a.s.∫
[0,T ]
Y¯ it dA¯
i
t = 0,
so that (2.b) is proved.
It does remain to conclude that the couple (β¯, A¯) is a weak Nash equilibrium of the game.
Fix i ∈ {1, ..., N}, and consider an admissible strategy Bi ∈ A(β¯). By Lemma 4.2 and Claims
(2.a) and (2.b) we have
J iβ¯(Bi, A¯−i)− J iβ¯(A¯i, A¯−i) ≥ EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Y¯ it (dB
i
t − dA¯it)
]
= EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Y¯ it dB
i
t
]
≥ 0,
which in fact completes the proof. 
4.4. On Lipschitz ε-Nash Equilibria for the Monotone-Follower Game. In this sub-
section we prove another connection between the Lipschitz games and the monotone-follower
game by showing that ε-Nash equilibria of the monotone-follower game can be realized as
Nash equilibria of the n-Lipschitz game, for n sufficiently large.
As in Subsection 4.3, in the following we consider fixed a basis β = (Ω,F ,P, f, L), and, for
each n ∈ N, let An = (A1,n, ..., AN,n) be a Nash equilibrium of the n-Lipschitz game as in
Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose that Assumption 4.1 holds and that there exists a constant C > 0
such that
(4.23) |hi(l, a)|+ |gi(l, a)| ≤ C(1 + |l|γ1 + |a−i|γ2),
for each l ∈ Rk and a = (a1, ..., aN ) ∈ RNd.
Then, for each ε > 0, there exists nε such that the Nash equilibrium A
nε of the nε-Lipschitz
game is an ε-Nash equilibrium of the monotone-follower game; that is, for each i = 1, ..., N
J iβ(Ai,nε , A−i,nε) ≤ J iβ(Bi, A−i,nε) + ε for each Bi ∈ Aβ.
Proof. We argue by contraddiction and we suppose that the thesis is false. Then, there exists
ε > 0 such that, for each n ∈ N, there exist in ∈ {1, ..., N} and an admissible strategy
Bn ∈ Aβ with
J inβ (An) > J inβ (Bn, A−in,n) + ε.
Since the number of indexes of the players is finite, we can suppose that there exists i ∈
{1, ..., N} such that, for each n ∈ N,
(4.24) J iβ(An) > J iβ(Bn, A−i,n) + ε.
Recall now that, for each n ∈ N, An is a Nash equilibrium for the n-Lipschitz game and notice
that the process constantly equal to zero is admissible. Hence, from (4.24), and using the
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coercivity condition (4.5) and the integrability condition (4.3) in Assumption 4.1, we find
cEP[|BnT |] ≤ J iβ(Bn, A−i,n) < J iβ(An)− ε
≤ J iβ(0, A−i,n) ≤ EP0
[∫ T
0
H i((piL)t) dt+G
i((piL)T )
]
<∞,
which implies that
(4.25) sup
n
EP[|BnT |] <∞.
With arguments analogous to those employed in the proof of Claim 1 of Theorem 4.4,
from the tightness condition (4.25) we deduce that there exists a subsequence of indexes (still
denoted by n) and a probability measure P˜ ∈ P(CNd+ ×Dk ×D(1+N)d↑ ) such that the sequence
P ◦ (f, L,Bn,An)−1 converges weakly to P˜.
Then, thanks again to an extension of Skorokhod’s theorem (see Theorem 3 in [28]), there
exists a probability space (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯), and, on it, a sequence
{(f¯n, L¯n, B¯n, A¯n)}n∈N
of CNd+ × Dk × D(1+N)d↑ -valued random variables, and a CNd+ × Dk × D(1+N)d↑ -valued random
variable (f¯ , L¯, B¯, A¯), such that
(i) Q¯ ◦ (f¯n, L¯n, B¯n, A¯n)−1 = P˜n and Q¯ ◦ (f¯ , L¯, B¯, A¯)−1 = P˜;
(ii) for Q¯-almost all ω ∈ Ω¯, we have
(4.26) sup
t∈[0,T ]
|f¯nt (ω)− f¯t(ω)| → 0,
as well as
(4.27) (L¯n(ω), B¯n(ω), A¯n(ω))→ (L¯(ω), B¯(ω), A¯(ω))
in the Lebesgue measure dt on [0, T ], and
(4.28) (L¯nT (ω), B¯
n
T (ω), A¯
n
T (ω))→ (L¯T (ω), B¯T (ω), A¯T (ω)).
Moreover, as in Lemma A.2, we can deduce that, for Q¯-almost all ω ∈ Ω¯, there exists a
constant M(ω) <∞ such that
sup
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(|L¯nt (ω)|+ |A¯nt (ω)|+ |L¯t(ω)|+ |A¯t(ω)|) ≤M(ω).
Hence, for Q¯-almost all ω ∈ Ω, we can find, by continuity of hi, another constant K(ω) such
that
sup
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
[
hi(L¯nt (ω), B¯
n
t (ω), A¯
−i,n
t (ω)) + h
i(L¯t(ω), B¯t(ω), A¯
−i
t (ω))
]
≤ K(ω),
and, by the convergence established in (4.27) and in (4.28), we conclude that Q¯-a.s.
lim
n
∫ T
0
hi(L¯nt , B¯
n
t , A¯
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯nT , B¯
n
T , A¯
−i,n
T )(4.29)
=
∫ T
0
hi(L¯t, B¯t, , A¯
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯T , B¯T , A¯
−i
T ),
where we have also used that hi and gi are continuous. Furthermore, thanks to the growth
condition (4.23), for p > 1 as in Assumption 4.1, we can find a suitable constant C˜ > 0 such
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that
sup
n
EQ¯
[∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
hi(L¯nt , B¯
n
t , A¯
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯nT , B¯
n
T , A¯
−i,n
T )
∣∣∣∣p ](4.30)
≤ C˜ sup
n
(
1 + EP0
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|(piL)t|γ1p
]
+ EP [|AnT |γ2p]
)
<∞,
where the integrability of the right-hand side follows from Condition (4.4) and from Lemma
A.1 in Appendix A. Finally, the limit in (4.29), together with the uniform integrability in
(4.30), allows us to conclude that
lim
n
EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯nt , B¯
n
t , A¯
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯nT , B¯
n
T , A¯
−i,n
T )
]
(4.31)
= EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯t, B¯t, A¯
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯T , B¯T , A¯
−i
T )
]
.
With a similar reasoning we also find
lim
n
EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯nt , A¯
i,n
t , A¯
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯nT , A¯
i,n
T , A¯
−i,n
T )
]
(4.32)
= EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯t, A¯
i
t, A¯
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯T , A¯
i
T , A¯
−i
T )
]
.
Moreover, Condition (4.4) yields we find
(4.33) sup
n
EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|f¯nt |αp + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|f¯t|αp
]
= 2EP0
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|(pif )t|αp
]
<∞.
The latter, together with (4.10) and (4.19) allows to use Lemma B.3 in Appendix B in order
to deduce that
lim
n
EQ¯
[∫ T
0
f¯ i,nt dA¯
i,n
t
]
= EQ¯
[∫
[0,T ]
f¯ it dA¯
i
t
]
,
which, together with (4.32), gives
(4.34) lim
n
J iβ(An) = J iβ¯(A¯i, A¯−i).
Fix now M ∈ N and define the sequence of processes {B¯n,M}n∈N by B¯n,Mt := B¯nt ∧M
as well as the process B¯Mt := B¯t ∧M . Observe that, for each n ∈ N, from (4.24) and the
definition of B¯n,M we have
(4.35)
J iβ¯(A¯n) > EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯nt , B¯
n
t , A¯
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯nT , B¯
n
T , A¯
−i,n
T )
]
+ EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
f¯ i,nt dB¯
n,M
t
]
+ ε.
Moreover, notice that the convergence established in (4.27) and in (4.28) implies that, Q¯-a.s.,
the sequence {B¯n,M}n∈N converges to B¯M in the measure dt+ δT on [0, T ].
Now, since the sequence {B¯n,M}n∈N is bounded by the constant M , we can use again
Lemma B.3 in Appendix B to deduce that
(4.36) lim
n
EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
f¯ i,nt dB¯
n,M
t
]
= EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
f¯ it dB¯
M
t
]
.
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Hence, thanks to (4.34), (4.31) and (4.36), for each fixed M we can pass to the limit in the
inequality (4.35), in order to obtain that
J iβ¯(A¯) ≥ EQ¯
[∫ T
0
hi(L¯t, B¯t, A¯
−i
t ) dt+ g
i(L¯T , B¯T , A¯
−i
T )
]
+ EQ¯
[ ∫
[0,T ]
f¯ it dB¯
M
t
]
+ ε.
Finally, by the monotone convergence theorem, we can take the limit as M →∞ in the latter
inequality to deduce that
(4.37) J iβ¯(A¯i, A¯−i) ≥ J iβ¯(B¯, A¯−i) + ε.
On the other hand, the probability measure Q¯ ◦ (f¯ , L¯, A¯)−1 is an accumulation point of
the sequence P ◦ (f, L,An)−1, and hence, by Theorem 4.4, the couple (β¯, A¯) is a weak Nash
equilibrium of the monotone-follower game, with β¯ := (Ω¯, F¯ , Q¯, f¯ , L¯). Moreover, B¯ is an
admissible strategy associated to the basis β¯; this implies that
J iβ¯(A¯i, A¯−i) ≤ J iβ¯(B¯, A¯−i),
which, together with (4.37), leads to a contradiction, and thus completes the proof. 
Remark 4.6. Theorem 4.5 can also be understood in a different way. Fix a weak Nash
equilibrium (β¯, A¯) which is an accumulation point of a sequence of Nash equilibria of the
n-Lipschitz game on a fixed basis β, and define
V = (V1, ...,VN ) := (J 1β¯ (A¯), ...,JNβ¯ (A¯)).
Then, V is a Nash equilibrium payoff of the monotone-follower game (see, e.g., Definition
2.7 in [17], or [48]), in the sense that, for each ε > 0, there exists Aε ∈ ANβ such that, for
each i = 1, ..., N , we have:
(1) J iβ(Ai,ε, A−i,ε) ≤ J iβ(Bi, A−i,ε) + ε for each Bi ∈ Aβ;
(2) |J iβ(Aε)− V i| ≤ ε.
Moreover, Theorem 4.5 shows that the Nash equilibrium payoff V is such that, for each ε > 0,
the profile strategy Aε, which satisfies the conditions of the definition above, can be chosen as
a Nash equilibrium of the n-Lipschitz game, for n large enough.
Remark 4.7. Notice that the submodularity conditions (2) and (3) in Assumption 2.2 are
not necessarily needed in the proof of Theorem 4.4 and 4.5. Indeed, oly the requirement that,
for each n ∈ N, there exists a Nash equilibrium for the n-Lipschitz game is needed. The
latter games can be seen as stochastic differential games, where the set of strategies is the
set of progressively measurable stochastic processes ui : Ω × [0, T ] → [0, n]d, with degenerate
dynamics Ait =
∫ t
0 u
i
sds. This fact suggests that, whenever the submodularity requirement does
not hold, one might exploit, on a case by case basis, existence results on equilibria for sochastic
differential games (see, e.g., [22] and references therein for results on stochastic differential
games).
5. Applications and Examples
5.1. Existence of Equilibria in a Class of Stochastic Differential Games. This sub-
section is devoted to show that Theorem 2.4 applies to deduce existence of open loop Nash
equilibria in stochastic differential games with singular controls, whenever a certain structure
is preserved by the dynamics. For the sake of illustration, we propose the following model.
Fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) satisfying the usual conditions and consider on
it N standard F-Brownian motions W i. Suppose to be given, for i = 1, ..., N , measurable
functions gi, hi : Rk × RN → R, as well as constants µi, σi ∈ R and continuous F-adapted
stochastic processes f i : Ω × [0, T ] → [0,∞). Assume moreover to be given an F-adapted
process L : [0, T ] × Ω → Rk with ca`dla`g components. The set of admissible strategies A
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is defined as the set of nondecreasing, nonnegative, ca`dla`g, F-adapted, R-valued stochastic
processes, whereas AN := ⊗Ni=1A denotes the set of asmissible profile strategies.
We consider the N -player stochastic differential game of singular controls in which, for
i = 1, ..., N , player i chooses an admissible strategy ξi ∈ A to control her private state, which
evolves according to the stochastic differential equation
(5.1) dXit = µ
iXit dt+ σ
iXit dW
i
t + dξ
i
t, t ∈ [0, T ], Xi0 = xi > 0,
in order to minimize her expected cost
J i(ξi, ξ−i) := E
[∫ T
0
hi(Lt, X
i
t , X
−i
t )dt+ g
i(LT , X
i
T , X
−i
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f itdξ
i
t
]
.
Observe that, for i = 1, ..., N , the solution to equation (5.1) is given by
(5.2) Xit = E
i
t
[
xi +
∫
[0,t]
1
Eis
dξis
]
= Eit
[
xi + ξ¯it
]
,
where the processes {Eit}t∈[0,T ] and {ξ¯it}t∈[0,T ] are defined by
(5.3) Eit := exp
[(
µi − (σ
i)2
2
)
t+ σiW it
]
and ξ¯it :=
∫
[0,t]
1
Eis
dξis.
Assumption 5.1. Let hi and gi satisfy Assumption 2.2. Suppose moreover that:
(1) for each i = 1, ..., N , there exist functions H˜ i, G˜i : Rk × R→ [0,∞) such that
hi(l, xi, x−i) ≤ H˜ i(l, xi) and gi(l, xi, x−i) ≤ G˜i(l, xi), for each (l, x) ∈ Rk × RN ,
with
E
[∫ T
0
H˜ i(Lt, E
i
t) dt+ G˜
i(LT , E
i
T )
]
<∞;
(2) there exists a constant k1 such that, for each i = 1, ..., N , we have g
i(l, x) ≥ k1xi for
each (l, x) ∈ Rk × RN .
Theorem 5.2. Under Assumption 5.1, there exists an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the
previously introduced stochastic differential game.
Proof. Thanks to (5.2), the cost functional of player i can be rewritten in terms of ξ¯i (cf.
(5.3)), that is
J i(ξi, ξ−i) = E
[ ∫ T
0
hi
(
Lt, E
i
t
[
xi + ξ¯it
]
,
{
Ejt
[
xj + ξ¯jt
]}
j 6=i
)
dt(5.4)
+ gi
(
LT , E
i
T
[
xi + ξ¯iT
]
,
{
EjT
[
xj + ξ¯jT
]}
j 6=i
)
+
∫
[0,T ]
f itE
i
t dξ¯
i
t
]
.
This leads to define the new functions h¯i, g¯i : Rk × (0,∞)N × RN → [0,∞) by
h¯i(l, e, zi, z−i) := hi(l, ei[xi + zi], {ej [xj + zj ]}j 6=i)
g¯i(l, e, zi, z−i) := gi(l, ei[xi + zi], {ej [xj + zj ]}j 6=i),
as well as the continuous processes f¯ i : Ω× [0, T ]→ R by f¯ it := f it Eit . These definitions allows
us to introduce new cost functionals in terms of new profile strategies ζ = (ζ1, ..., ζN ) ∈ AN
setting
J¯ i(ζi, ζ−i) := E
[ ∫ T
0
h¯i(Lt, Et, ζ
i
t , ζ
−i
t )dt+ g¯
i(LT , ET , ζ
i
T , ζ
−i
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f¯ itdζ
i
t
]
.
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Notice that, by (5.4) and the definition of ξ¯i in (5.3) as a function of ξi, we have that
J¯ i(ξ¯i, ξ¯−i) = J i(ξi, ξ−i), ∀ ξ ∈ AN , ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Furthermore, for each ζ ∈ AN there exists a unique ξ ∈ AN such that ζi = ξ¯i for each
i ∈ {1, ..., N}. This means that solving the stochastic differential game in the class of profile
strategies ξ ∈ A and with cost functionals J i is equivalent to solve the monotone-follower
game for ζ ∈ A and cost functionals J¯ i. The rest of the proof is then mainly devoted to show
that the costs h¯i and g¯i, together with the processes f¯ i, satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2.4.
Since the functions hi and gi satisfy Assumption 2.2, for each (l, e, z−i) ∈ Rk × (0,∞)N ×
RN−1 the functions h¯i(l, e, ·, z−i) and g¯i(l, e, ·, z−i) are clearly continuous and strictly convex.
Moreover, for (l, e) ∈ Rk × (0,∞)N and z, z¯ ∈ RN such that z ≤ z¯, we have ej [xj + zj ] ≤
ej [xj + z¯j ] for each j = 1, ..., N , since the components of e are positive. Therefore, because
hi has decreasing differences, we deduce that
h¯i(l, e, z¯i, z−i)− h¯i(l, e, zi, z−i)
= hi(l, ei[xi + z¯i], {ej [xj + zj ]}j 6=i)− hil, (ei[xi + zi], {ej [xj + zj ]}j 6=i)
≥ hi(l, ei[xi + z¯i], {ej [xj + z¯j ]}j 6=i)− hi(l, ei[xi + zi], {ej [xj + z¯j ]}j 6=i)
= h¯i(l, e, z¯i, z¯−i)− h¯i(l, e, zi, z¯−i),
which means that h¯i has decreasing difference as well. In the same way it is possible to show
that g¯i has decreasing differences, and this allows to conclude that the functions h¯i and g¯i
satisfy Assumption 2.2. Moreover, thanks to (1) in Assumption 5.1, Condition 2.6 is clearly
satisfied with ri(ζ) = 0 for each ζ ∈ AN .
We prove now that the functionals J¯ i satisfy a slightly different version of Condition 2.5.
The superlinear condition (2) in Assumption 5.1 implies that
J¯ i(ζi, ζ−i) ≥E [g¯i(LT , ζiT , ζ−iT )] = E [gi(LT , EiT [xi + ζiT ] ,{EjT [xj + ζjT ]}
j 6=i
)]
≥ k1E
[
EiT
[
xi + ζiT
]] ≥ k1E [EiT ζiT ] = k1 E[EiT ]EP˜i [ζiT ] ,
where P˜i is the probability measure on (Ω,F) given by
dP˜i :=
EiT
E[EiT ]
dP,
and equivalent to P.
We can therefore apply Theorem 2.4 (in fact a slightly different version of it, in which the
expectation in Condition 2.5 is replaced by the expectation under an equivalent probability
measure) to deduce existence of a Nash equilibrium ζˆ = (ζˆ1, ..., ζˆN ) of the monotone-follower
game with cost functionals J¯ i. Hence the process ξˆ = (ξˆ1, ..., ξˆN ) defined by
ξˆit :=
∫
[0,t]
Eis dζˆ
i
s
is an open loop Nash equilibrium of the stochastic differential game. 
Remark 5.3. The same arguments employed in the proof of Theorem 5.2 apply if we replace
the dynamics of the controlled geometric Brownian motion in (5.1) by the dynamics of a
controlled Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process
dXit = θ
i(µi −Xit) dt+ σi dW it + dξit, t ∈ [0, T ], Xi0 = xi > 0,
for some parameters θi, σi > 0 and µi ∈ R. Mean-reverting dynamics (as the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
one) find important application in the energy and commodity markets (see, e.g., [12] or Chap-
ter 2 in [50]).
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5.2. An Algorithm to Approximate the Least Nash Equilibrium. In this subsection
we prove that, also in our setting, the algorithm introduced by Topkis (see Algorithm II in
[67]) for submodular games converges to the least Nash equilibrium of the game.
According to the notation of Section 2, define the sequence of processes {Rn}n∈N ⊂ AN in
the following way:
• R0 = 0 ∈ AN ;
• for each n ≥ 1, set Rn+1 := R(Rn).
Theorem 5.4. Suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 2.4 hold. Assume, moreover, that
there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for each i = 1, ..., N ,
(5.5)
hi(l, a) + gi(l, a) ≤ C(1 + |a|), ∀ (l, a) ∈ Rk × RNd and |f it | ≤ C, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s.
Then the sequence {Rn}n∈N is monotone increasing in the lattice (AN ,4N ) and it converges
to the least Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof. Since the map R : AN → AN is increasing (cf. Step 3 in the proof of Theorem 2.4),
the sequence {Rn}n∈N is clearly monotone increasing with respect to the order relation in
AN .
Define now the process S := (S1, ..., SN ) ∈ AN as the least upper bound of the sequence
{Rn}n∈N in the lattice (AN ,4N ). We claim, and prove later, that there exists a P-null set N
such that, for each ω ∈ Ω \ N , there exists a countable subset I(ω) of [0, T ) such that,
(5.6) St(ω) = lim
n
Rnt (ω) ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] \ I(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω \ N .
We next show that the limit point S is a Nash equilibrium. By Step 2 in the proof of
Theorem 2.4, we know that there exists a suitable constant C˜ such that, for each n ∈ N,
E[|RnT |] ≤ C˜. Hence, by the monotone convergence theorem, we deduce that
(5.7) E[|ST |] ≤ C˜.
Fix then i ∈ {1, ..., N} and Bi ∈ A. If E[|BiT |] =∞, then, by the coercivity condition (2.5), we
would automatically have J i(Si, S−i) ≤ J i(Bi, S−i) =∞. Hence, without loss of generality,
we can assume that
(5.8) E[|BiT |] <∞.
Now, since Ri,n+1 minimizes J i(·, R−i,n), for each n ∈ N we can write
E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, R
i,n+1
t , R
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , R
i,n+1
T , R
−i,n
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dR
i,n+1
t
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, B
i
t, R
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , B
i
T , R
−i,n
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dB
i
t
]
.
Moreover, the limit in (5.6), together with conditions (5.5) and the estimates (5.7) and (5.8),
allows us to invoke the dominated convergence theorem and to take the limit as n goes to
infinity in the last inequality in order to deduce that J i(Si, S−i) ≤ J i(Bi, S−i). Hence S is
a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we prove that S is the least Nash equilibrium. Suppose that S¯ is another Nash
equilibrium. By definition we have R0 = 0 4N S¯. If, for an arbitrary n ∈ N, we have
Rn 4N S¯, then, since the map R is increasing and S¯ is a fixed point of R, we have Rn+1 =
R(Rn) 4N R(S¯) = S¯. Hence, by induction, we deduce that Rn 4N S¯ for each n ∈ N, which
in turn implies that S 4N S¯, since S is the least upper bound of the sequence {Rn}n∈N.
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To conclude the proof it only remains to prove the limit in (5.6). Recall the construction
of S and S˜ (cf. (2.9) and (2.10) in Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 2.4). Notice that, since the
sequence {Rn}n∈N is increasing in the lattice (AN ,4N ), there exists a P-null set N such that
(5.9) Rnt (ω) ≤ Rn+1t (ω), ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], ∀n ∈ N, ∀ω ∈ Ω \ N .
Hence we can assume
S˜q(ω) = lim
n
Rnq (ω), ∀ q ∈ Q := ([0, T ] ∩Q) ∪ {T}, ∀ω ∈ Ω \ N .
Since, for each ω ∈ Ω \ N , ST (ω) = S˜T (ω) by definition, then the limit in (5.6) is verified in
T . Take now t¯ ∈ (0, T ). If, for ω ∈ Ω \ N , the limit in (5.6) does not hold in t¯, then there
exists ε > 0 such that
sup
n
Rnt¯ (ω) + ε ≤ St¯(ω).
Hence, for q ∈ Q such that q < t¯, we find
S˜q(ω) + ε = sup
n
Rnq (ω) + ε ≤ sup
n
Rnt¯ (ω) + ε ≤ St¯(ω).
This implies that, whenever s < t¯, we have
Ss(ω) + ε := inf
s<q<t¯, q∈Q
S˜q(ω) + ε ≤ St¯(ω),
and hence that
St¯−(ω) + ε := sup
s<t¯
Ss(ω) + ε ≤ St¯(ω).
The latter means that t¯ is in the set I(ω) of discontinuity points of S(ω). Because I(ω) is
countable, the limit in (5.6) is then proved, and the proof is completed. 
6. An Extension of Theorem 2.4 with Regular Controls
In this section we generalize Theorem 2.4 to the case in which players are allowed to choose
both a regular and a singular control.
Recall the notation introduced in Section 2. Fix a square-integrable random variable Θ
and define the space of regular controls
U :=
{
u : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rd
∣∣∣∣u is F¯f,L+ -progressively measurable and |ut| ≤ Θ P⊗ dt− a.e.} ,
the space of admissible strategies U × A, and the space of admissible profile strategies (U ×
A)N := ⊗Ni=1 U × A. Elements of U × A will be denoted by X = (u,A), while elements of
(U ×A)N will be denoted by X = (X1, ..., XN ).
For each i = 1, ..., N , consider measurable functions hi, gi : Rk × R2Nd → [0,∞). We
define the game in which each player i ∈ {1, ..., N} is allowed to choose an admissible strategy
Xi = (ui, Ai) ∈ U ×A in order to minimize the cost functional
J i(Xi, X−i) :=E
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt,Xt) dt+ g
i(LT ,AT ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i
t
]
,(6.1)
where X−i := (Xj)j 6=i and X := (Xi, X−i) ∈ (U ×A)N .
Next, on the space of admissible strategies U ×A, we define the order relation 4 such that,
for X,Y ∈ U ×A, one has
X 4 Y ⇐⇒ ut ≤ vt and At ≤ Bt P⊗ dt− a.e.
Moreover, endow the space U × A with a lattice structure, defining the processes X ∧ Y :=
(u ∧ v,A ∧B) and X ∨ Y := (u ∨ v,A ∨B) where
(u ∧ v)t := ut ∧ vt and (u ∨ v)t := ut ∨ vt P⊗ dt− a.e.,
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and
(A ∧B)t := At ∧Bt and (A ∨B)t := At ∨Bt P⊗ dt− a.e.
In the same way, on the set of profile strategies (U × A)N , define, for X,Y ∈ (U × A)N , an
order relation 4N by
X 4N Y ⇐⇒ Xi 4 Y i ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N},
together with the lattice structure
X ∧Y := (X1 ∧ Y 1, ..., XN ∧ Y N ) and X ∨Y := (X1 ∨ Y 1, ..., XN ∨ Y N ).
Then, Theorem 2.4 admits the following generalization.
Theorem 6.1. For each i = 1, ..., N , assume that:
(1) for each (l, x−i) ∈ Rk × R2(N−1)d, the functions hi(l, ·, x−i) and gi(l, ·, x−i) are lower
semi-continuous, and strictly convex;
(2) for each l ∈ Rk the functions hi(l, ·, ·) and gi(l, ·, ·) have decreasing differences in
(xi, x−i);
(3) for each (l, x−i) ∈ Rk × R2(N−1)d, the functions hi(l, ·, x−i) and gi(l, ·, x−i) are sub-
modular;
(4) there exist two constants K,κ > 0 such that
J i(Xi, X−i) ≥ κE [|AiT |]
for all X ∈ (U ×A)N with
E
[|AiT |] ≥ K;
(5) there exists a constant M > 0 such that
for all X ∈ (U ×A)N there exists ri(X) ∈ U ×A such that J i(ri(X), X−i) ≤M.
Then the set of Nash equilibria F ⊂ (U × A)N is non empty, and the partially ordered set
(F,4N ) is a complete lattice.
Proof. For w := 2Mκ ∨K, recall the definition of A(w) given in (2.7). Combining arguments
from Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 2.4, and from Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.1, it
is possible to show that the best reply maps Ri : (U × A)N → U × A(w) are well defined.
Moreover, the same reasoning employed in Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 2.4 allows us
to deduce that the best reply maps are increasing with respect to the order relations on
(U × A)N and U × A. Then, in order to complete the proof, it remains to show that the
lattice ((U ×A(w))N ,4N ) is complete, and, in view of Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 2.4, it
is enough to prove that the lattice (U ,4) is complete (where, by a slight abuse of notation,
we indicate by 4 the order relation on U).
Define on the lattice (U ,4) the topology I of intervals (see, e.g., p. 250 in [14]); that
is, the topology for which the topology of closed sets is generated by the family of sets
Iz := {u ∈ U : u 4 z} and Iz := {u ∈ U : z 4 u} for z ∈ U .
We now aim at proving that the topology I is included in the weak topology of L2([0, T ]×
Ω;Rd). To accomplish that, we show that, for each z ∈ U , the set Iz is closed for the weak
topology σ of L2([0, T ]×Ω;Rd) by proving that Iz is convex and closed for the strong topology
of L2([0, T ]× Ω;Rd).
Take {un}n∈N ⊂ Iz converging to u in L2([0, T ] × Ω;Rd). Since, for each n ∈ N, un ∈ U ,
we clearly have that u ∈ U . Furthermore, by definition of Iz, we have, unt − zt ≤ 0 P⊗ dt-a.e.
This implies that, P⊗ dt-a.e., we have (unt − zt)1{ut−zt>0} ≤ 0, so that
E
[∫ T
0
(unt − zt)1{ut−zt>0} dt
]
≤ 0, ∀n ∈ N.
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Now, since {un}n∈N converges strongly to u, hence weakly, we deduce that
E
[∫ T
0
(ut − zt)1{ut−zt>0} dt
]
≤ 0, ∀n ∈ N,
which in turns implies that, ut − zt ≤ 0 P ⊗ dt-a.e. Therefore, u ∈ Iz, which proves that Iz
is closed for the strong topology. Since the set Iz is convex, Iz is also closed for the weak
topology. Analogous arguments show that Iz is closed for the weak topology, and this allows
us to conclude that the topology I is contained in the weak topology σ.
Now, since the space U is weakly closed and bounded for the L2([0, T ] × Ω;Rd) norm, by
Alaoglu’s theorem (see Theorem 6.21 at p. 235 in [1]) it follows that it is weakly compact, and
then, because of the inclusion I ⊂ σ, we deduce that U is compact for the topology I. By a
characterization of complete lattices (see Theorem 20 at p. 250 in [14]), from the compactness
of U in the interval topology I it follows that the lattice (U ,4) is complete, and this proves
the theorem. 
Appendix A. Technical Lemmata
Throughout the rest of this technical appendix we assume that Assumption 4.1 holds.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Fix i ∈ {1, ..., N}. By convexity of hi and gi (cf. Assumption 4.1) we
have
J iβ(Bi, A−i)− J iβ(Ai, A−i)
= EP
[ ∫ T
0
(
hi(Lt, B
i
t, A
−i
t )− hi(Lt, Ait, A−it )
)
dt+
∫
[0,T ]
f it (dB
i
t − dAit)
]
+ EP
[
gi(LT , B
i
T , A
−i
T )− gi(LT , AiT , A−iT )
]
≥ EP
[ ∫ T
0
∇ihi(Lt, Ait, A−it )(Bit −Ait) dt+
∫
[0,T ]
f it (dB
i
t − dAit)
]
+ EP
[∇igi(LT , AiT , A−iT )(BiT −AiT )] .
Then, integrating by parts and recalling (4.6), we obtain
J iβ(Bi, A−i)− J iβ(Ai, A−i)
≥ EP
[ ∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
∇ihi(Ls, Ais, A−is )ds
)
(dBit − dAit) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it (dB
i
t − dAit)
]
+ EP
[(∫ T
0
∇ihi(Ls, Ais, A−is )ds
)
(Bi0 −Ai0)
]
+ EP
[∇igi(LT , AiT , A−iT )(BiT −AiT )]
= EP
[ ∫
[0,T ]
(∫ T
t
∇ihi(Ls, Ais, A−is )ds
)
(dBit − dAit) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it (dB
i
t − dAit)
]
+ EP
[∇igi(LT , AiT , A−iT )(BiT −AiT )]
= EP
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Y it (dB
i
t − dAit)
]
.

Proof of Lemma 4.3. Fix i ∈ {1, ..., N} and n ∈ N. Define the RNd-valued process un =
(u1,n, ..., uN,n) as the time derivative of the process An, i.e., for i = 1, ..., N , set ui,nt :=
d
dtA
i,n
t
P⊗ dt-a.e.
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Take ε > 0 and consider an arbitrary admissible n-Lipschitz strategy Bi ∈ Lβ(n). Define
then vit :=
d
dtB
i
t P ⊗ dt-a.e., and Ai,ε := Ai,n + ε (Bi − Ai,n). Since un is a Nash equilibrium
of the n-Lipschitz game, then Ai,n minimizes J iβ(·, A−i,n). Hence, by employing Lemma 4.2,
the definition of Ai,ε and setting P-a.s.,
Y i,n,εt :=
∫ T
t
∇ihi(Lt, Ai,εt , A−i,nt ) dt+∇igi(LT , Ai,εT , A−i,nT ) + f it , t ∈ [0, T ],
we have
0 ≥ EP [Ci(L,Ai,n, A−i,n)]− EP [Ci(L,Ai,ε, A−i,n)] ≥ εEP [∫ T
0
Y i,n,εt (dA
i,n
t − dAεt )
]
.
After dividing by ε, we obtain
EP
[∫ T
0
Y i,n,εt (u
i,n
t − vit) dt
]
≤ 0.
We claim (and prove later) that by taking limits as ε→ 0 we have
(A.1) lim
ε→0
EP
[∫ T
0
Y i,n,εt (u
i,n
t − vit) dt
]
= EP
[∫ T
0
Y i,nt (u
i,n
t − vit) dt
]
,
and hence
EP
[∫ T
0
Y i,nt (u
i,n
t − vit) dt
]
≤ 0,
which implies that
EP
[∫ T
0
(Y i,nt )
+ (ui,nt − vit) dt
]
≤ EP
[∫ T
0
(Y i,nt )
− (ui,nt − vit) dt
]
.
Now, for j = 1, ..., d, denote by ej the jth element of the canonical basis of Rd. Taking
vit := n
∑d
j=1 1{Y i,n,jt ≤0} ej , we find
0 ≤ EP
[∫ T
0
(Y i,nt )
+ ui,nt dt
]
≤ EP
[∫ T
0
(Y i,nt )
− (ui,nt − n1) dt
]
,
and, because the right-hand side of the latter is non positive as ui,n ≤ n, we have
EP
[∫ T
0
Y i,nt u
i,n
t dt
]
= −nEP
[∫ T
0
(Y i,nt )
−1 dt
]
,
which proves (4.8) upon recalling that dAi,nt = u
i,n
t dt P-a.s.
In order to prove (4.9) notice that Lemma 4.2 and (4.7) give
0 ≤ EP [Ci(f, L,An)] ≤ EP [Ci(f, L, 0, A−i,n)]+ EP [∫ T
0
Y i,nt dA
i,n
t
]
.
Hence from (4.8) and the latter we have that
EP
[∫ T
0
(Y i,nt )
−1 dt
]
≤ E
P [Ci(f, L, 0, A−i,n)]
n
≤ 1
n
EP0
[∫ T
0
|H i((piL)s)| ds+ |G((piL)T )|
]
,
which, thanks to Condition 2 in Assumption 4.1, implies (4.9).
In order to complete the proof it only remains to prove (A.1). To do so, since |ui,nt −vt| ≤ 2n
for all t ∈ [0, T ] P-a.s., it is enough to prove that Y i,n,ε converges to Y i,n in L1(Ω × [0, T ]).
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Notice that, for a suitable constant C˜ > 0, we have
EP
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣Y i,n,εt − Y i,nt ∣∣∣ dt] ≤C˜EP [∫ T
0
∣∣∣∇ihi(Lt, Ai,n,εt , A−i,nt )−∇ihi(Lt, Ai,nt , A−i,nt )∣∣∣ dt]
(A.2)
+ C˜EP
[∣∣∣∇igi(LT , Ai,n,εT , A−i,nT )−∇igi(LT , Ai,nT , A−i,nT )∣∣∣] .
Moreover, for ε → 0 we have that Ai,εt converges to Ai,nt for each t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s. Thus, by
the continuity of ∇ihi and ∇igi, we have, P-a.s.
(A.3) lim
ε→0
∣∣∣∇ihi(Lt, Ai,n,εt , A−i,nt )−∇ihi(Lt, Ai,nt , A−i,nt )∣∣∣ = 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
and
(A.4) lim
ε→0
∣∣∣∇igi(LT , Ai,n,εT , A−i,nT )−∇igi(LT , Ai,nT , A−i,nT )∣∣∣ = 0.
Furthermore, since we are always considering integrals of processes bounded by n, we have
that |A−i,nT | ≤ nd(N − 1)T and, for ε < 1, that |Ai,εT | ≤ 2ndT . Hence, thanks to the growth
conditions (2) in Assumption 4.1, we find
|∇ihi(Lt, Ai,εt , A−i,nt )|p ≤ C˜
(
1 + sup
[0,T ]
(|Ls|γ1p )
)
=: C˜η ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
|∇igi(LT , Ai,εT , A−i,nT )|p ≤ C˜η,
|∇ihi(Lt, Ai,nt , A−i,nt )|p ≤ C˜η ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
|∇igi(LT , Ai,nT , A−i,nT )|p ≤ C˜η,
where p > 1 is as in the Assumption 4.1.
The previous estimates together with the integrability condition (4.4) in Assumption 4.1
imply that the two members on the right-hand side of (A.2) are uniformly integrable. This
fact, together with the limits in (A.3) and (A.4), allows us to invoke the dominated convergence
theorem in order to conclude that the two members on the right-hand side of (A.2) converge
to 0 as ε→ 0. This completes the proof of the lemma.

Lemma A.1. For q > 1 as in Assumption 4.1, we have that
sup
n
EP [|AnT |q] <∞.
Proof. Fix i ∈ {1, ..., N} and r > 0, and define the Rd-valued process
(A.5) Ai,n,rt := A
i,n
t∧T i,n(r)
where T i,n(r) := inf{ t ∈ [0, T ] : Ai,nt ≥ r }, with the usual convention that inf ø = ∞. Now,
since Ai,n,r is not the best response to A−i,n, we have
EP
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, A
i,n
t , A
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , A
i,n
T , A
−i,n
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i,n
t
]
≤ EP
[ ∫ T
0
hi(Lt, A
i,n,r
t , A
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , A
i,n,r
T , A
−i,n
T ) +
∫
[0,T ]
f it dA
i,n,r
t
]
.
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Therefore, using (A.5),
EP
[ ∫ T
T∧T i,n(r)
f it dA
i,n
t
]
≤ EP
[ ∫ T
T∧T i,n(r)
(
hi(Lt, r, A
−i,n
t )− hi(Lt, Ai,nt , A−i,nt )
)
dt
]
(A.6)
+ EP
[
gi(LT , A
i,n,r
T , A
−i,n
T )− gi(LT , Ai,nT , A−i,nT )
]
(A.7)
Thanks to the assumption (4.5) in Assumption 4.1, we also find
(A.8) cEP
[
(Ai,nT − r)1{Ai,nT >r}
]
≤ EP
[ ∫ T
T∧T i,n(r)
f it dA
i,n
t
]
.
Moreover, on the event {Ai,nT > r}, we have that r ∈ [0, Ai,nt ] for each t ∈ [T ∧ T i,n(r), T ].
Hence r is a convex combination of 0 and Ai,nt for each t ∈ [T ∧ T i,n(r), T ], and by convexity
of hi and gi we find∫ T
T∧T i,n(r)
hi(Lt, r, A
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , r, A
−i,n
T )(A.9)
≤
∫ T
T∧T i,n(r)
hi(Lt, A
i,n
t , A
−i,n
t ) dt+
∫ T
0
hi(Lt, 0, A
−i,n
t ) dt
+ gi(LT , A
i,n
T , A
−i,n
T ) + g
i(LT , 0, A
−i,n
T ).
Thus, by using (A.8) and (A.9) in (A.6), we obtain
cEP
[
(Ai,nT − r)1{Ai,nT >r}
]
≤ EP
[
1{Ai,nT >r}
(∫ T
0
hi(Lt, 0, A
−i,n
t ) dt+ g
i(LT , 0, A
−i,n
T )
)]
≤ EP
[
1{Ai,nT >r}
(∫ T
0
|H i(Ls)| ds+ |Gi(LT )|
)]
.
Thanks to the integrability condition (4.4) in Assumption 4.1, we can apply Lemma 33 in [47]
to conclude that
sup
n∈N
EP[|Ai,nT |q] < q C˜ EP
[∫ T
0
|Zi(Ls)|q ds+ +|Gi(LT )|q
]
<∞,
for a suitable constant C˜ > 0, which finally implies the claim of the Lemma. 
Lemma A.2. There exists G ∈ F¯ of full Q¯-measure such that for each ω ∈ G there exists a
constant M(ω) <∞ such that
sup
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(|L¯nt (ω)|+ |A¯nt (ω)|+ |L¯t(ω)|+ |A¯t(ω)|) ≤M(ω).
Proof. Recalling (4.13) and (4.10), by Fatou’s lemma we find
(A.10) EQ¯[|A¯T |q] ≤ sup
n
EQ¯[|A¯nT |q] = sup
n
EP[|AnT |q] <∞.
Hence Q¯-a.s., |AnT | <∞, and again by the convergence in (4.13) we deduce that Q¯-a.s.
(A.11) sup
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
A¯nt = sup
n
A¯T
n
<∞.
We now show that, Q¯-a.s.,
sup
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|L¯nt | <∞.
Let Q := ([0, T ) ∩Q) ∪ {T} and define the measurable function Φ : Dk → R by
Φ(X) := sup
t∈Q
|Xt|.
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Then, as in the proof of (Claim 1) of Theorem 4.4, it is possible to show that the sequence
{(f,Φ(L), L,An)}n∈N is tight in P(CNd+ × R × Dk × DNd↑ ). Indeed, Φ(L) is constant w.r.t.
n and integrable, and hence tight in P(R). Thus (modulo taking another subsequence) the
application of Skorokhod representation theorem reveals that there exist R-valued random
variables M¯n and M¯ on Ω¯ such that: Q¯ ◦ (f¯n, M¯n, L¯n, A¯n)−1 = P ◦ (f,Φ(L), L,An)−1, Q¯ ◦
(f¯ , M¯ , L¯, A¯)−1 = P¯ and M¯n converges to M¯ Q¯-a.s. Furthermore, Q¯◦(M¯n, L¯n)−1 is constantly
equal to P ◦ (Φ(L), L)−1, and then the same holds for the limit; that is Q¯ ◦ (M¯, L¯)−1 =
P ◦ (Φ(L), L)−1. This implies that, for each n ∈ N,
Q¯[|M¯n − Φ(L¯n)| = 0] = Q¯[|M¯ − Φ(L¯)| = 0] = P[|Φ(L)− Φ(L)| = 0] = 1,
hence M¯n = Φ(L¯n) and M¯ = Φ(L¯) Q¯-a.s.
Now, thanks to the integrability condition (4.4) in Assumption 4.1, we have
(A.12) EQ¯[M¯ ] = EQ¯
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|L¯t|
]
= EP[Φ(L)] = EP
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Lt|
]
<∞.
Then M¯ <∞ Q¯-a.s., and since Φ(L¯n) converges to M¯ Q¯-a.s., we finally deduce that
(A.13) sup
n
sup
t∈[0,∞)
|L¯nt | = sup
n
Φ(L¯n) <∞.
Combining then (A.10), (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13) we find the thesis. 
Lemma A.3. For every i = 1, ..., N , Y¯ i,n converges to Y¯ i uniformly on the interval [0, T ],
Q¯-a.s.
Proof. First we prove that Q¯-a.s.
(A.14) lim
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣∫ T
t
(∇ihi(L¯ns , A¯ns )−∇ihi(L¯s, A¯s)) ds ∣∣∣∣ = 0.
From Lemma A.2, there exists G of full Q¯-measure such that for each ω ∈ G we have
sup
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(|L¯nt (ω)|+ |A¯nt (ω)|+ |L¯t(ω)|+ |A¯t(ω)|) ≤M(ω) <∞,
and from (4.2) in Assumption 4.1 we deduce that for each ω ∈ G there exists a constant K(ω)
such that
sup
n
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(∣∣∇ihi(L¯nt (ω), A¯nt (ω))∣∣+ ∣∣∇ihi(L¯t(ω), A¯t(ω))∣∣) ≤ K(ω) <∞.
Hence, for any given ω ∈ G, the bounded continuous function ∇ihi(l, a) ∧ K(ω) coincides
with the function ∇ihi(l, a) when evaluated along the sequence (L¯ns (ω), A¯ns (ω)) and at the
limit point (L¯s(ω), A¯s(ω)). Therefore, in what follows we will consider ω ∈ G fixed (we will
not stress anymore the dependence on it in the following), and we will assume that ∇ihi is
bounded by K.
For m ∈ N and j = 1, ...,m, consider now the bounded continuous functions ϕj,n : [0, T ]→
R defined by
ϕj,ns :=1
(
(j−1)T
m
, jT
m
](s)
(
s− (j − 1)T
m
)
m
T
+ 1( jTm ,T ]
(s).
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Since each t ∈ [0, T ] belongs to some interval
(
(jt−1)T
m ,
jtT
m
]
for some jt ∈ {1, ...,m}, we have∣∣∣∣∫ T
t
(∇ihi(L¯ns , A¯ns )−∇ihi(L¯s, A¯s)) ds ∣∣∣∣(A.15)
=
∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
1[t,T ](s)
(∇ihi(L¯ns , A¯ns )−∇ihi(L¯s, A¯s)) ds ∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
(
1[t,T ](s)− ϕjt,ms
) (∇ihi(L¯ns , A¯ns )−∇ihi(L¯s, A¯s)) ds ∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
ϕjt,ms
(∇ihi(L¯ns , A¯ns )−∇ihi(L¯s, A¯s)) ds ∣∣∣∣
≤ 2T K
m
+
∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
ϕjt,ms
(∇ihi(L¯ns , A¯ns )−∇ihi(L¯s, A¯s)) ds ∣∣∣∣ .
Fix now ε > 0 and take m¯ := m¯(ω) large enough such that 2T K/m¯ < ε/2.
For each j = 1, ..., m¯, the function ϕj,m¯s ∇ihi(l, a) is bounded and continuous. Hence, by
the convergence established in (4.12), and the characterization (B.2), we can find n¯(j) :=
n¯(j, ω) ∈ N, such that∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
ϕj,m¯s
(∇ihi(L¯ns , A¯ns )−∇ihi(L¯s, A¯s)) ds ∣∣∣∣ < ε/2, ∀n ≥ n¯(j).
Since the js are at most m¯, we can find n¯ := n¯(ω) large enough such that∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
ϕj,m¯s
(∇ihi(L¯ns , A¯ns )−∇ihi(L¯s, A¯s)) ds ∣∣∣∣ < ε/2, ∀n ≥ n¯, ∀ j ≤ m¯.
With this choice of n¯, from (A.15) we find that,∣∣∣∣∫ T
t
(∇ihi(L¯ns , A¯ns )−∇ihi(L¯s, A¯s)) ds ∣∣∣∣ < ε,
and, since n¯ is independent of t,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣∫ T
t
(∇ihi(L¯ns , A¯ns )−∇ihi(L¯s, A¯s)) ds ∣∣∣∣ < ε, ∀n ≥ n¯;
that is, (A.14) is proved.
Now, by continuity of∇igi and the convergence at the terminal point T established in (4.13),
the sequence ∇igi(L¯nT , A¯nT ) converges Q¯-a.s. to ∇igi(L¯T , A¯T ). Finally, by (4.11), we have the
uniform convergence of the sequence f¯ i,n. Hence, we conclude that, for every i = 1, ..., N ,
Y¯ i,n converge to Y¯ i, uniformly on the interval [0, T ], Q¯-a.s. 
Appendix B. Meyer-Zheng Convergence
In this appendix we recall some fact about the so-called Meyer-Zheng topology (see [54])
and we provide some results concerning the tightness of ca`dla`g processes in such a topology.
Pseudopath topology. For a generic m ∈ N, let Dm[0,∞) be the space of Rm-valued ca`dla`g
functions on [0,∞), with the Borel σ-algebra generated by the Skorokhod topology. On the
half line [0,∞), consider the measure λ given by dλ := e−tdt, where dt denotes the Lebesgue
measure on R. The pseudopath topology τpp on Dm[0,∞) is the topology induced by the
convergence in the measure λ on the interval [0,∞). Notice that we introduce the pseudo-
path topology through its characterization proved in Lemma 1 in [54]. Furthermore, recall
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that we have defined (cf. Subsection 4.3) the pseudopath topology τTpp on the space Dm as the
topology induced by the convergence in the measure dt + δT on the interval [0, T ], where δT
denotes the Dirac measure at the terminal point T . Observe that both the topologies τpp and
τTpp are metrizable.
Define now the space D˜m[0,∞) as the set of elements of Dm[0,∞) which are constant on
[T,∞), and notice that D˜m[0,∞) is a closed subset of Dm[0,∞). Also, observe that the
extension map Ψ : Dm[0, T ]→ D˜m[0,∞), defined by
(B.1) Ψ(x)t :=
{
xt if t ∈ [0, T ]
xT if t ∈ (T,∞),
is an omeomorphism between the topological spaces (Dm, τTpp) and (D˜m[0,∞), τpp).
In the same way, define the space D˜m↑ [0,∞) as the set of elements of D˜m[0,∞) which are
nondecreasing and nonnegative. Notice that D˜m↑ [0,∞) is a closed subset of Dm[0,∞) and
that the extension map Ψ gives an omeomorphism between the topological spaces (Dm↑ , τTpp)
and (D˜m↑ [0,∞), τpp).
If {xn}n∈N is a sequence of functions in Dm converging to a function x ∈ Dm in the
pseudopath topology τTpp, then we have that (see, e.g., Appendix A.3. at p. 116 in [47])
(B.2) lim
n
∫ T
0
φ(s, xns ) ds =
∫ T
0
φ(s, xs) ds, and lim
n
xnT = xT ,
for each bounded continuous function φ : [0, T ]× Rm → R.
Meyer-Zheng topology and tightness criteria. The Meyer-Zheng topology on P(Dm[0,∞)) is
the topology of weak convergence of probability measures on the topological space (Dm[0,∞), τpp);
in the same way we define the Meyer-Zheng topology on P(Dm) as the topology of weak con-
vergence of probability measures on the topological space (Dm, τTpp).
For a given filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) consider a ca`dla`g process X : Ω× [0, T ]→
Rm, and consider the conditional variation of X over the interval [0, T ], defined as
(B.3) V PT (X) := sup
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣E[Xti −Xti−1 |Fti−1 ]∣∣]+ E[|Xtn |],
where the supremum is taken over all the partitions 0 = t0 < ... < tn ≤ T , n ∈ N. Moreover,
for a ca`dla`g process X : Ω× [0,∞)→ Rm, define the conditional variation of X as
(B.4) V P(X) := sup
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣E[Xti −Xti−1 |Fti−1 ]∣∣] ,
where the supremum is taken over all the partitions 0 = t0 < ... < tn =∞, n ∈ N, of [0,∞),
and where have we set X∞ = 0. We recall the following tightness criteria (see [54], Theorem
4).
Theorem B.1 (Meyer and Zheng, 1984). Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence of Rm-valued ca`dla`g
processes such that
sup
n
V P(Xn) <∞.
Then {P ◦Xn}n∈N is tight in P(Dm[0,∞))
We finally prove, for the sake of completeness, a slightly different version of the theorem
above that is useful in many occasions during our study.
Lemma B.2. The following tightness criteria hold true.
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(1) Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence of Rm-valued ca`dla`g processes defined on [0, T ] such that
sup
n
V PT (X
n) <∞.
Then {P ◦Xn}n∈N is tight in P(Dm).
(2) Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence of nondecreasing, nonnegative, Rm-valued ca`dla`g processes
defined on [0, T ] such that
sup
n
E[|XnT |] <∞.
Then {P ◦Xn}n∈N is tight in P(Dm↑ ).
Proof. We will prove only the claim (1), the proof of claim (2) follows by an analogous
rationale. Using the extension map Ψ defined in (B.1), we have that
sup
n
V P(Ψ(Xn)) = sup
n
V PT (X
n) <∞.
Then, we can invoke Theorem B.1 to deduce that the sequence {P ◦ Ψ(Xn)}n∈N is tight in
P(Dm[0,∞)). Furthermore, since D˜m[0,∞) is a closed subset of Dm[0,∞), we have that
{P ◦ Ψ(Xn)}n∈N is tight in P(D˜m[0,∞)). This means that, for each ε > 0, there exists a
compact set Kε in the topological space (D˜m[0,∞), τpp) such that
P[Ψ(Xn) ∈ Kε] ≥ 1− ε for each n ∈ N.
Now, since the map Ψ is an omeomorphism, for each ε > 0 we have that Ψ−1(Kε) is a compact
subset of the topological space (Dm, τTpp), and
P[Xn ∈ Ψ−1(Kε)] = P[Ψ(Xn) ∈ Kε] ≥ 1− ε for each n ∈ N;
that is, the sequence {P ◦Xn}n∈N is tight in P(Dm) in the Meyer-Zheng topology. 
We finally summarize in a lemma a result on the convergence of stochastic integrals.
Lemma B.3. Let {Fn}n∈N be a sequence of Rm-valued continuous processes which converges
P-a.s. to an Rm-valued continuous process F uniformly on [0, T ]. Let {Xn}n∈N be a sequence
of nondecreasing, nonnegative, Rm-valued ca`dla`g processes defined on [0, T ], which converges
P-a.s. to nondecreasing, nonnegative, Rm-valued cadlag process X in the pseudopath topology
τTpp. Suppose, moreover, that there exists two constant α, p > 1 such that
(B.5) sup
n
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(|Fnt |αp + |Ft|αp) + |XnT |
αp
p−1 + |XT |
αp
p−1
]
<∞.
Then
(B.6) lim
n
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Fnt dX
n
t
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Ft dXt
]
.
Proof. We will prove that for each subsequence of indexes there exists a further subsequence
for which the limit in (B.6) holds true.
Consider then a subsequence of indexes (not relabeled). We organize the rest of the proof
in three steps.
(Step 1) There exists a further subsequence of indexes nj and a random variable Z ∈ Lα(Q¯)
such that
(B.7) lim
j
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
F
nj
t dX
nj
t
]
= E[Z].
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Notice that there exists a suitable constant C˜ > 0 such that
E
[∣∣∣∣ ∫
[0,T ]
Fnt dX
n
t
∣∣∣∣α ] ≤ C˜E[ sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Fnt |α|XnT |α
]
(B.8)
≤ C˜
(
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Fnt |αp
]) 1
p (
E
[
|XnT |
αp
p−1
]) p−1
p
.
Using now (B.5) we find
(B.9) sup
n
E
[∣∣∣∣ ∫
[0,T ]
Fnt dX
n
t
∣∣∣∣α ] <∞;
that is, that the sequence {∫[0,T ] Fnt dXnt }n∈N is bounded in Lα(Q¯).
Since α > 1, by the reflexivity of Lα(Q¯), there exists a subsequence {∫[0,T ] Fnjt dXnjt }j∈N
and a random variable Z ∈ Lα(Q¯), for which the limit in (B.7) holds true.
(Step 2) We have that
(B.10) lim
j
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Ft dX
nj
t
]
= E[Z].
Following a rationale similar to that yielding (B.9), it is possible to prove the following
uniform integrability estimates
sup
j
E
[∣∣∣∣ ∫
[0,T ]
Ft dX
nj
t
∣∣∣∣α ] <∞.(B.11)
Furthermore, by assumption, the sequence {|XnT |}n∈N is P-a.s. convergent, hence bounded, so
that
(B.12) lim
j
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Ft − Fnjt | |XnjT | = 0, P-a.s.
Now, thanks to the limit in (B.12) and to the uniform integrability estimates (B.11) and (B.9),
we deduce that
lim
j
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
(Ft − Fnjt ) dXnjt
]
= 0,
and from (B.7), we conclude that
lim
j
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Ft dX
nj
t
]
= lim
j
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
(Ft − Fnjt ) dXnjt
]
+ lim
j
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
F
nj
t dX
nj
t
]
= E[Z],
(B.13)
which completes the proof of Step 2.
(Step 3) E[Z] coincides with the right-hand side of (B.6).
Fix δ > 0. We extend by zero the processes Xn and X on the interval [−δ, 0); that is, for each
n ∈ N and t ∈ [−δ, 0), we set Xnt := 0 and Xt := 0. Furthermore, we extend by continuity
the processes Fn and F on the interval [−δ, 0); that is, for each n ∈ N and t ∈ [−δ, 0), we set
Fnt := F
n
0 and Ft := F0. Thanks to our assumption, we have that Q¯-a.s.
(B.14) Xn → X in the measure dt+ δT on the interval [−δ, T ].
Moreover, since by Condition (B.5) the sequence {XnjT }j∈N is bounded in L1(Q¯), then, by (a
minimal adjustment to [−δ, T ] of) Lemma 3.5 in [39], there exist a nondecreasing, nonnegative,
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Rm-valued ca`dla`g process B defined on [−δ, T ] and a subsequence (not relabeled) of {Xnj}j∈N
such that, Q¯-a.s.,
(B.15) lim
m
∫ T
−δ
ϕtdB
m
t =
∫ T
−δ
ϕtdBt ∀ϕ ∈ Cb((−δ, T );Rd) and lim
m
BmT = BT ,
where we have set, Q¯-a.s.
(B.16) Bmt :=
1
m
m∑
j=1
X
nj
t , ∀t ∈ [−δ, T ].
Now, thanks to the convergence in (B.14) and to (an analogous for the interval [−δ, T ] of)
(B.2), we deduce that Q¯-a.s.
lim
j
∫ T
−δ
φ(s,X
nj
s ) ds =
∫ T
−δ
φ(s,Xs) ds,
for each bounded continuous function φ : [−δ, T ]×Rd → R. Hence, letting ϕ ∈ C∞c ((−δ, T );Rd),
and recalling that the sequence {|XnT |}n∈N is P-a.s. bounded, an integration by parts reveals
that, Q¯-a.s., ∫ T
−δ
ϕtdXt = −
∫ T
−δ
Xtϕ
′
tdt = − lim
j
∫ T
−δ
X
nj
t ϕ
′
tdt,
The latter, together with (B.15), implies that (again using integration by parts), Q¯-a.s.,∫ T
−δ
ϕtdBt = lim
m
1
m
m∑
j=1
∫ T
−δ
ϕtdX
nj
t = − limm
1
m
m∑
j=1
∫ T
−δ
X
nj
t ϕ
′
tdt =
∫ T
−δ
ϕtdXt.
Therefore, by the fundamental lemma of the Calculus of Variation (see Theorem 1.24 at p.
26 in [25]) and by right-continuity of X and B we deduce that Bt = Xt for all t ∈ [−δ, T ).
Finally, using the convergence at the terminal point T in the second equation of (B.15), we
deduce that
(B.17) Bt = Xt, ∀t ∈ [−δ, T ], Q¯-a.s.
Next, by (B.11), since α > 1, we find that
sup
m
E
[∣∣∣∣ ∫ T−δ Ft dBmt
∣∣∣∣α ] ≤ sup
m
1
m
m∑
j=1
E
[∣∣∣∣ ∫ T−δ Ft dXnjt
∣∣∣∣α ] ≤ sup
j
E
[∣∣∣∣ ∫ T−δ Ft dXnjt
∣∣∣∣α ] <∞,
(B.18)
which implies that the sequence {∫ T−δ FtdB¯mt }m∈N is uniformly integrable. Moreover, by (B.5),
it follows that, P-a.s., F is a bounded (by a constant depending on ω) and continuous function
on the interval [−δ, T ] . Hence by (B.15) and (B.17) we have, Q¯-a.s.,
(B.19) lim
m
∫ T
−δ
Ft dB
m
t =
∫ T
−δ
Ft dXt.
Furthermore, from the pointwise limit (B.19) and the uniform integrability estimate (B.18),
we have
lim
m
E
[∫ T
−δ
Ft dB
m
t
]
= E
[∫ T
−δ
Ft dXt
]
.
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This allows to deduce, using (B.10) of Step 2 and the fact that the processesXnj are constantly
null on [−δ, 0), that
E[Z] = lim
m
1
m
m∑
j=1
E
[∫ T
−δ
Ft dX
nj
t
]
= lim
m
E
[∫ T
−δ
Ft dB
m
t
]
= E
[∫ T
−δ
Ft dXt
]
.
Since now the process Xt is null on [−δ, 0), we conclude from the latter that
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Ft dXt
]
= E[Z],
which is in fact the thesis of Step 3. 
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